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ABSTRACT  
 
Do the lived experiences of people who have been breached by Centrelink 
match the expectation and intent of the Howard Government? 
 
 
In the past three years, the number of breach penalties applied by Centrelink to 
welfare recipients have more than trebled, with some 349,000 incidences 
reported for the 2000-2001 year. This Masters Degree research study examines 
the lived experience of some individuals who have been breached by Centrelink, 
to ascertain whether their lived experiences accord with the stated policy 
expectations and intent of the Howard Government. Government policy 
statements are identified from the literature, as are a range of alternative 
viewpoints and critiques offered by commentators.  
 
A qualitative research survey instrument was developed. Survey data was 
collected from people passing on the footpath outside three Brisbane Centrelink 
offices. Fifty-six individuals who stated they had been breached at least once 
responded. The results of primary and secondary analysis of the collected data is 
presented in the findings, followed by discussion as to how the lived experiences 
of the unemployed respondents matched Government expectation and intent.  
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INTRODUCTION:  
 
The central objective of this thesis is to explore the lived experience of people 
who have received one or more breach penalties from Centrelink, to see if their 
experiences match the expectation and intent of the breaching policy 
implemented by the current Howard Coalition Government. 
 
In order to progress development of useful research questions, it was necessary 
to conduct a formal literature review and also obtain some Government policy 
statements and Centrelink guideline publications. The status of current 
legislation, policy and practice was ascertained in regard to breaching, so that it 
could be defined. Greater understanding was required as to what could have 
caused the trebling of breach penalties over the last three years, to the level of 
349,000 as reported by (ACOSS, 2001b; Pearce, Disney, & Ridout, 2002) for the 
2000/2001 year. The literature review is outlined in Chapter One. 
 
Central to the whole issue of breaching penalties appears to be the now 
entrenched political ideology of Mutual Obligation (Kinnear, 2000; Hartman, 
2001; McKenna, 1999), together with entrenched high levels of unemployment 
(Borland, 2000; Burgess, Mitchell, O'Brien, & Watts, 1998; Edwards, Howard, & 
Miller, 2001; Mitchell, 2000; Quiggin, 2001). The large majority of people who 
receive breaches from Centrelink are unemployed, receiving payments under 
either the New Start Allowance program or the Youth Allowance program (Sleep, 
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2001, p.2). Both programs include ‘activity test’ conditions with which 
unemployment beneficiaries must comply in order to avoid breach penalty.  
 
Understanding derived from this analysis helps to establish a contextual 
framework, in which to examine the way in which the economic and social reality 
of high unemployment interacts with neo-liberal political ideology that gives rise 
to Mutual Obligation policy. The policy appears to underpin various justifications 
for increases in the number of unemployed people who have been breached by 
Centrelink. This in turn raised an initial research question; “would Centrelink and 
the Job Network achieve the policy objectives that the Government had set when 
establishing and justifying its breaching regime?” 
 
Selection of a qualitative survey for the study was determined by time and 
resource constraints. A survey instrument was developed, based on an extensive 
literature review that included ‘inside’ government perspectives and data. 
Reports identifying harm done to unemployed individuals when breached were 
noted, such as Anglicare’s assertion that Centrelink’s  “punish first” approach 
was costly for individuals (Rollason, 2001), and ACOSS (2000) report that  
“obligations on unemployed people were unreasonable and unfair”  (p.2).  
 
This study found that people who were breached had their lives seriously 
affected in one or more of four important areas, which the Howard Government 
does not publicly acknowledge as being expected or intended. One finding 
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indicated that as a result of being breached, most survey respondents reported 
experiencing decreased self-esteem. A second finding indicated that most 
respondents had strong feelings of being unfairly treated. A third finding indicated 
that many respondents needed to move into less desirable accommodation as a 
consequence of breaching. A fourth finding reinforced the notion that the Howard 
Government is pressuring social security welfare recipients to move ‘off-benefit’, 
onto the support of family and community charities. 
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CHAPTER ONE: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE; SETTING THE SCENE 
 
Development of welfare programs, compulsory activities and penalties. 
 
Since the British occupied Australia, there has been little social willingness to 
share community wealth with those deemed ‘work-shy’ or the unworthy poor 
(Hall, 1998; Windschuttle, 1980). Clarke (1998) observed: “The Aboriginal 
custom of sharing resources was not understood, and settlers began to accuse 
the natives of being lazy thieves who preferred to steal the colonists’ flour and 
crops of fruit and vegetables, rather than do an honest days work” (p.62, italics 
added). The colonists did not acknowledge they had stolen the productive land 
from the Aborigines. Welfare assistance from the State, in the 19th century, 
divided individuals “as existing either side of a deserving/undeserving binary 
divide” (Hall, 1998, p. 3). von Hayek (2000) recognised paternalistic government 
allocation of welfare to individuals, which was divided into quantities “which it 
thinks they need or deserve” (p. 93), and that divide continues to exist (Hammer, 
2002). 
 
Hartman (2001) cited Gwyther:  “The old ‘shame game’, where compliance to 
community norms was enforced by public humiliation or social exclusion for 
infringements” (p. 5) is still played today, evidenced by Government entreaties to 
“dob in a dole bludger” (Vanstone, 2002b). While declaring “only a small 
proportion” of welfare recipients are undeserving or not entitled to benefits, 
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Government Ministers continue to use emotive language, such as “flushing out 
the dole cheats” (Brough, 2001, p.8), designed to give the impression that people 
who receive welfare payments are unwilling to accept work (Vanstone, 2002b),  
or are ‘welfare dependant’ (Newman, 2000). Unemployed people are therefore 
‘undeserving’ and in need of ‘coercive authority’ to return them to a state of 
worthiness (Atkins, 2002; Kinnear, 2000, p.10). 
 
Bryson (1993) noted that the term ‘welfare’ in Australia does not apply to all 
citizens, but is “applied selectively to those who… are seen as not able to provide 
for themselves…those who are poor or relatively poor”. She believed those 
notions were graphically illustrated by a negative description of welfare services 
as “a safety net” (p. 464). However Sleep (2001) found welfare compliance 
provisions to be a “mechanism of social control” (p. 1). 
 
The Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, 
DEWRSB (2001) reported that “compliance strategies” are not new. Activity 
testing has long been a key function in the administration of income–support 
systems, where job seekers could be compelled to participate in  programs “or 
risk losing their benefits” (p.9).  
 
In 2000, Ian Sharples, Director, Employment Strategies Section, Parenting 
Payment and Labour Market Branch, Department of Family and Community 
Services, together with Assistant Director, Jillian Moses, presented a paper at the 
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7th National Conference on Unemployment at Campbelltown NSW. That paper is 
often cited in this study, because it is one of few ‘inside’ commentaries available 
on breaching practices from within the Department, which is a major ‘purchaser’ 
of the Centrelink welfare delivery system.  
 
Moses and Sharples (2000) refer to the penalty loss or reduction of benefit 
imposed by Centrelink as a ‘breach’ and refer to the general practice as 
‘breaching’. Admitting that their Department has a ‘hard line’ approach to 
breaching (p. 17), they noted that non-payment penalties were originally called 
‘postponement periods’,  for breaches of activity requirements and voluntary 
unemployment. These have been a “feature of the administration of social 
security payments for the unemployed in Australia” since 1947 (p.2).  
 
Breaching applies particularly to unemployment recipients who have activity tests 
applied to them. Activity tests are designed to ensure adherence to mandatory 
job search programs, such as Work for the Dole. Terms such as ‘dole system’, 
‘doling out’ and ‘dole bludgers’ derived from the practice of doling out food to 
unemployed people on ‘susso’ lines during the Great Depression (Hartman, 
2001; Windschuttle, 1980).  This pejorative language would be ‘politically 
incorrect’ today, if developed for people who have disabilities, or are of different 
race, culture or mature age. For ‘the unemployed’ it remains politically acceptable 
(Vanstone, 2002b; Atkins, 2002).  
 
 8 
Tomlinson (1999) pointed out that “when this denigration of the workless started, 
official unemployment was less than 4%, it now stands at over 7%”. He argued 
that whilst a greater percentage of people than ever before are now in the labour 
market,  “we are still asked to believe that the ranks of the unemployed are 
swelled by those unwilling to work” (p. 1). 
 
Post World War ll, soaring unemployment began in the 1970’s. Burgess, Mitchell, 
O'Brien and Watts (2000) cited Jones: “public expenditure on unemployment 
benefits increased from $8.8 m. in 1970 to $925.2m. in 1980” (p.175). Concern 
for fiscal blowout and belief that unemployed people were not trying hard enough 
to find jobs began to unsettle governments of Liberal and Labor persuasions 
(Edwards et al., 2001; Giddens, 1998). Whilst the 1947 Unemployment Benefit 
legislation first brought a compulsory activity component (Moses & Sharples, 
2000), the Whitlam Labor Government first brought in an employment assistance 
program combined with a compulsory component (Sawer, 2000).  
 
Then Minister for Social Security, Hayden initially “abolished the provision which 
allowed the Department to deem someone ‘unworthy’” based upon his personal 
perception of a right to benefit entitlement, “except in situations which were 
specifically precluded by social security legislation” (Tomlinson, 2001, p. 3). By 
1974, moving away from this ‘rights’ viewpoint, Ministers Hayden and Cameron 
subsequently began casting slurs about unemployed people being “work shy lion 
tamers” and “dole bludgers” (Windschuttle, 1980, pp. 180-190). Professor Bettina 
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Cass proposed  “extending the work testing of unemployed people to encompass 
activity testing” (Lawrence, 2002).  
 
Sawer (2000) cited Eardley’s report that it was the Hawke Government that 
brought in “reciprocal obligation” which meant that unemployment (dole) 
payments became increasingly dependent on compliance and activity 
requirements of some sort. “In 1986 the minimum postponement [of payment] 
was re-set at 2 weeks. In 1987, 1989 and 1990 additional reasons were added 
for imposing a non-payment penalty” (Moses & Sharples, 2000, p.3). Burgess et 
al. (2000) reported that preparedness to look to work tests were replaced by 
more extensive activity tests in 1990.  
 
The Keating Labor Government produced a 1994 white paper, entitled Working 
Nation, to introduce reciprocal obligation for the long-term unemployed. 
Extensive changes to breaching arrangements included new legislation to 
establish distinction between administrative and activity test breaches, with 
harsher penalties imposed for activity test breaches. “Penalties for both types of 
breach increased with duration on [sic] payment and with each subsequent 
breach” (Moses & Sharples, 2000, p. 3). See also  (Quiggin, 2001, p. 10). 
 
With the advent of the Howard Government, Burgess et al. (2000) argued that 
continuing fiscal pressure for balanced budgets together with continuing 
restructuring of the State in Australia “will force unemployment assistance to be 
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subject to further eligibility tests, reciprocal obligations and extended sanctions”. 
Unemployment payments were no longer a right “but were now made conditional 
upon participation in employment programs” (pp. 174-186). Castles (2001) 
argued that “the Government is well on the way to restoring the conditionality of 
payment which makes welfare a charity rather than a right” (p. 102). Entrenched 
unemployment appears to influence Howard Government policy and rhetoric.  
 
Entrenched unemployment and the rise of long-term unemployment. 
 
An understanding of the current breaching regime cannot be developed without 
recognition of what Burgess et al. (2000) called the “entrenched long-term 
unemployment” levels in Australia (p. 177), because the large majority of people 
who receive Centrelink penalty breaches receive unemployment benefits.  
 
“Unemployment has increased dramatically in Australia since the mid-1970’s”. 
Even the economic upturns in the late 1980’s and late 1990’s were not enough to 
restore the unemployment rate to the level held in the early 1970’s, before the 
first oil shock. “Over the last two decades, the lowest rate of unemployment was 
5.4 per cent (November 1989)” (Borland, 2000, p.1).  
 
By contrast; “in 1974 the rate of unemployment was less than 3 per cent” (Watts, 
2001, p. 3).  Bagnall (1999) reported that “unemployment spending has gone 
from 0.03% of GDP [Gross Domestic Product] to 1.13% over the past three 
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decades – the largest single contributor to the total increase in [Departmental 
Welfare Benefit] spending” (p. 48).  
 
Bell observed that “despite the OECD Jobs Study (1994), there is increasing 
scepticism about the capacity of neo-liberal reforms to reduce high 
unemployment rates that have prevailed in most OECD economies since the 
mid-1970’s” (cited in Watts, 2001, p.5). In Australia, the scepticism is well 
documented.  Quiggin (2001) asserted that “recent developments in the labour 
market provide clear evidence of the failure of the economic policies adopted 
since the election of the Howard Government” whilst noting that rising 
unemployment is “likely to reach 7.5 per cent by 2002” (p. 3).  
 
Mitchell (2000) argued that the private employment sector could not absorb all 
unemployment during the period of public service cutbacks and massive 
privatisations that arose from economic fundamentalist policies, especially those 
of the Howard Government, which had “chosen to abandon the full employment 
ideal”. Mitchell considered that “until the public sector restores a commitment to 
full employment, Australia will languish with high unemployment and the resulting 
increases in inequality” (p.32).   
 
Graetz and McAllister (1988) considered that “systematic inequalities emerge as 
a consequence of unequal social origins” which generate workforce 
unemployment (p. 206). However by 1994 it was obvious to many commentators 
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that there were simply not enough jobs, regardless of social origin or skill levels 
(Langmore & Quiggin, 1994).  Burgess et al. (1998) argued “demand deficiency” 
was the cause of the unemployment problem (p.17). Any perceived skill 
deficiency of unemployed people was not to blame for the high rates of 
unemployment in Australia, argued The Courier Mail; “Jobs the only real welfare 
reform” required to reduce unemployment levels (Editorial, 1999). 
 
McKinnon and Dorries (1999) reported almost 700,000 jobless in March, 1999, 
“having peaked this decade at 946,000 in September 1993” and “the major 
constraint for the unemployed finding a job was not wages but a lack of job 
offers” (p.4). See also (Borland, 2000). Noting that the economy had improved 
and unemployment had reduced, Quiggin (2001) found that employers “seek 
increased hours of work and extra effort from existing workers” rather than  
taking on new workers, concluding that “the basic problem is a simple shortage 
of job vacancies” (p. 8). 
 
Thus with high unemployment levels came a rise in the number of people who 
are long-term unemployed (Bagnall, 1999, p. 48).  Burgess et al. (1998) reported 
“in Australia the average duration of unemployment rose from three weeks in 
1966…to 50.5 weeks in 1998”, while long-term unemployment (defined as one 
year or longer) share of total unemployment has increased over the past twenty 
years “from 12.3% (1978) to 36.2%” (p.3). ACOSS (1998) cited Gregory and 
Sheehan, who put the 1999 figure at 31%  (p. 3).  
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Just two years later, Minister Newman reported 722,000 people received 
unemployment benefits in the current year, with 457,000 of those people (60 per 
cent) “having received benefits for longer than one year” (Newman, 2000, p. 9). 
Increasingly, however, jobs are now more often part-time, casualised, short-term 
and low paid. As a consequence people often find themselves “churning” 
between short-term unemployment welfare and short-term temporary paid work 
(Lawrence, 2002). This suggests the long-term unemployed cannot ‘churn’ 
because there are insufficient jobs. 
  
Continuing high levels of unemployment and welfare expenditure have focused 
the Howard Government in pursuing an ideologically driven economic 
fundamentalist agenda, based upon its perceptions of the efficiency of private 
enterprise and ‘globalisation’ (Bronson & Rousseau, 1996; Donald, 2000; Held, 
1995; Hutchings, 1998; Jones & May, 1998; Strange, 1996). The Government 
continues to announce initiatives designed to compel people to urgently look for 
work and engage in programs, such as the Work for the Dole program, which it 
justifies by using the ideology of Mutual Obligation (Burgess et al., 1998, p.7).  
 
It is worth noting that Neuman (1997) described ideologies as having “fixed, 
strong, and unquestioned assumptions…full of unquestioned absolutes and 
normative categories” (p. 38). Lauritsen (2001) argued that the Government, in 
“emphasising the responsibility of individuals and their families, and disciplining 
those who fail in their obligations” has shifted the accent “from one of a lack of 
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employment to a problem with unemployed individuals” (pp. 13-14).  See also 
(Titmuss, 2000, pp.47-48; Watts, 2001 p. 5). However, as Jennings (2001) noted; 
“it is contentious that government promotes mutual obligation policy within a 
climate of insufficient employment and with no consideration to structural 
barriers” (p. 5).  
 
This contentiousness is also grounded in van Parijs' (2000)  observation that “the 
indignation of the jobless who are morally and legally expected to keep looking 
for what many know they will never find, is matched by the outrage of those who 
subsidize with their social security contributions the idleness of people who are 
overtly transgressing the rules of the game” (p. 357). Upon these unproven 
premises, sanctions against unemployed people continue to be justified under 
the ideology of Mutual Obligation  
 
The Howard Government’s Mutual Obligation ideology. 
 
In discussing the Howard Government’s introduction of the policy of Mutual 
Obligation, Quiggin (2001) considered crucial change was embodied in a 
rhetorical shift from ‘reciprocal obligation’ to Mutual Obligation. “The substantive 
shift associated with this change in rhetoric was a unilateral restatement of the 
government’s side of the obligation”. Under Mutual Obligation, “the obligations of 
government are discharged by the payment of benefits” alone, because the 
Howard Government “has declined to specify any full employment target” (p. 12).  
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Burgess et al. (2000) reported 1997 Work for the Dole legislation was enacted by 
the Howard Government to embrace the concept of “mutual obligation”. The Bill 
(Social Security Amendment Bill) was “designed specifically to remove those 
legislative provisions preventing recipients from being required to work for their 
unemployment benefits” (pp.174-178, italics in original). ACOSS (2001a) noted 
“the administration of the activity test was tightened” in 1997, when Mutual 
Obligation was introduced, and decried the consequent negative effects that the 
tightening had on unemployment benefit recipients (p.3).  
 
Prime Minister Howard described Mutual Obligation in terms whereby the 
Government should support those in genuine need. However he also noted “it is 
the case that – to the extent that it is within their capacity to do so – those in 
receipt of such assistance should give something back to society in return, and in 
the process improve their own prospects for self-reliance” (Howard, 1999, p.10). 
‘Giving something back to society’ could include specified volunteer work, study 
to improve employment prospects or Work for the Dole.  
 
Under the headline “Howard’s Tough Love”, McKenna (1999) quoted Minister 
Newman: “an increasing number of older unemployed are not required to chase 
jobs as hard as their younger counterparts”. Minister Newman was reported to 
believe this created a fiscal burden on the nation, encouraged “welfare 
dependence” and created “a very severe stigma” on people who remain on 
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welfare support. The Minister decried the idea that “people can go on payments 
and they can stay on payments forever” (p. 11).  
 
The next year, Minister Anthony announced tightened activity test requirements 
were to be incorporated in new Preparing for Work Agreements. He stated that 
“mutual obligation is based on the proposition that unemployed people supported 
financially by the community should actively seek work, constantly strive to 
improve their competitiveness in the labour market  and give something back to 
the community”, adding “this leaves people with a sense of pride and 
belonging…” (Anthony, 2000, p.1; Richardson, 2000).  
 
Shortly thereafter, Ministers Reith and Newman announced that in future “all job 
seekers would have to fulfill some form of mutual obligation service in exchange 
for their support benefit” (Burgess et al., 2000, p.180). In a joint paper, Ministers 
Vanstone and Abbott foreshadowed the broadening of Mutual Obligation and 
activity test requirements to include single parents with school age children and 
older unemployed people. Their rationale was that the new requirements “will 
keep people active and connected” to their community whilst looking for work 
(McKenna, 1999; Vanstone & Abbott, 2001, p.4).  
 
Minister Brough followed through, announcing that under principles of Mutual 
Obligation; “All jobless up to the age of 50 will be targeted for Work for the Dole 
programs” (Jackman, 2002, p. 5). See also (Centrelink, 2001a). Burgess et al. 
 17
(2000) considered the Howard Government had enacted the most radical 
transformation of labour market policy since 1945. “The unemployed have been 
given citizenship and community obligations, unlike any other group in the 
community receiving either welfare or public sector assistance, such as tariffs, 
subsidies, tax concessions, price stabilisation measures, production subsidies 
and age pensions” (p.178) 
 
Burgess et al. (2000) continued “Mutual obligation has now become a hallmark of 
the unemployment benefit system in Australia”. Obligation now rests more firmly 
on the unemployed than on Government. The unemployed “are subject to more 
surveillance, duties, and punitive measures than previously”, in part because 
(citing Pike): “the means testing of benefits and tighter eligibility criteria indicate 
that Government sees recipients as [a] burden to the public” (pp.180-181). 
However Quiggin (2001) recognised that the Howard Government’s employment 
welfare programs, including Work for the Dole and activity tests, were politically 
popular (pp. 11-12).  
 
Political popularity is carefully nurtured by the Howard Government, and is 
reflected in the Government’s re-election to a third term. For example, Minister 
Newman released a government commissioned Roy Morgan research report on 
community attitudes towards the unemployed which predictably found that “most 
people (92%) thought that unemployed recipients should be required to 
undertake activities that would improve their chances of finding a job” (Morgan, 
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2000, p.15). See also the “acceptability” level of activity test requirements 
reported in another Government commissioned survey (Wallis, 2000, p. 8). 
 
Grattan noted, cited in Burgess et al. (2000), that unemployment programs such 
as “Work for the Dole have been described purely as a political gesture to 
appease commonly held prejudices about unemployed youth” (p.181). The 
Government and the press now focus beyond youth. The Courier Mail’s Jackman 
(2002) headlined; “Work for dole net to widen” with a sub heading; “Unemployed 
older workers have been put on notice: The days of collecting the dole with no 
strings attached will end on July 1” in 2002 (p. 5). The ‘strings that have been 
attached’ since 1947 escape attention, as do the morally and ethically 
questionable aspects of Mutual Obligation. 
 
Kinnear (2000) found that imposing obligation only upon the least well-off in 
society eroded “the ethical case for a social contract”. Further, when those in 
positions of social advantage demand social repayments from those who are 
disadvantaged, as happens under Mutual Obligation policy, that “may be a 
manifestation of moral decline” (p. VI, italics in original). Goodin (2001) argued 
that obliging people to sign contractual activity agreements in return for welfare 
benefits lacked moral force. The notion “agree or starve” (without benefit 
payment) was analogous to the highway robber’s demand “your money or your 
life!” (p. 191).  
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Rees (2000) discussed the loss of human rights resulting from Mutual Obligation. 
He warned that when a government “emphasises that rights have to be earned, 
that people can only insist on their rights if they have carried out their social 
responsibilities…it softens a general public for the idea that rights are conditional, 
not universal” (pp. 296-297). Tomlinson (1999) argued that “the words  ‘welfare 
dependency’ have taken on connotations of abuse, of failing to meet legitimate 
responsibilities, and something just short of cheating or defrauding the State” (pp. 
3-4). Chapter Two, following, details Centrelink breaching policy and practice.  
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CHAPTER TWO: CENTRELINK BREACHING POLICY AND PRACTICE 
 
What is Breaching?   
 
Breaching measures involve penalties that reduce or stop payment of benefit for 
a period. Breach penalties are mainly targeted towards unemployed people in 
receipt of unemployment payments. The payments are administered by 
Centrelink under either New Start Allowance or Youth Allowance programs, and 
include Austudy. 
 
In July 1997 the Government had its thrice-amended breach penalty program 
passed by Parliament. The second reading of the bill noted that the main 
objective was “to maintain a strong deterrence for failure to meet reasonable 
requirements”. It was thought that rigorous application of activity test 
requirements was important to maintain community support for the system of 
unemployment payments and to encourage active job search by beneficiaries 
(Moses & Sharples, 2000, p. 4).  
 
The parliamentary speech also cited an OECD Job Study’s conclusion that “a 
priori reasoning and historical evidence both suggest that if benefit administration 
can be kept tight, the potential disincentive effects of benefit entitlement will be 
largely contained” (Moses & Sharples, 2000, p.4). However, there are many 
commentators who argue strongly that the notion of disincentive effects is largely 
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mythical (Gilmour, Hartman, & Jennings, 2000, p. 4; Goodin, 2001; Pearce et al., 
2002; Windschuttle, 1980, p.175).  
 
Centrelink is an umbrella Commonwealth Government agency that delivers 
welfare distribution services to the public. Several government agencies 
‘purchase’ Centrelink delivery services, including Department of Family and 
Community Services (DfaCS), and Department of Employment, Workplace 
Relations and Small Business (DEWRSB). Centrelink also administers various 
social security programs, such as the Age Pension, Disability Support Pension 
and various Unemployment allowances legitimated under the Social Security Act. 
Thus Centrelink facilitates payment of set benefits and allowances to people who 
become ‘recipients’ when they can demonstrate entitlement. 
 
Centrelink breach policy is part of a compliance control strategy (DEWSRB, 
2001), whereby Centrelink is authorised to temporarily withhold partial or total 
payment from a welfare recipient deemed to be in breach of a Centrelink 
requirement. Sleep, (2001) defined a Centrelink breach occurred when, 
“according to a Centrelink officer, [customers] should be financially punished for 
not satisfactorily complying with their activity test or administrative duties” (p.2). 
 
Activity test breaches are now more often applied by Centrelink than are 
administrative breaches (ACOSS, 2001b). Activity test breach penalty rates are 
more costly for recipients (Moses & Sharples, 2000; Sleep, 2001), and are 
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applicable to benefit payments that have an activity test requirement, including 
Youth Allowance, New Start Allowance and Austudy (Sleep, 2001, p.2). Activity 
test requirements extend to the national Job Network of privately owned, publicly 
funded employment training and placement agencies. Centrelink (2001b) 
explained: “Failure to turn up for interviews, without an adequate reason, may 
result in a breach penalty being imposed, regardless of whether the appointment 
was made by Centrelink or a Job Network member” (p. 1). 
 
Payment recipients subject to activity tests can also be breached for failure to 
comply with Centrelink administrative requirements, as can other categories of 
beneficiaries such as people who receive Partner Allowance, Parenting Payment 
and Disability Support Pensions. Administrative matters such as failing to reply to 
a Centrelink letter or not advising change of address can incur an administrative 
breach. “If you do not meet an administrative requirement, you are likely to have 
your payment reduced by 16 per cent for 13 weeks or receive no payment for two 
weeks” (Centrelink, 2001a, pp. 1-2). Although non-cumulative, such 
administrative breaches can be continually reapplied. 
 
Activity test penalties can reduce payments differentially depending on whether 
they are first, second or third penalties in a two-year period. “The first penalty 
attracts an 18 per cent reduction in payment for 26 weeks. The second penalty 
attracts a 24 per cent rate reduction in payment for 26 weeks whilst the third and 
following penalties mean no payment for eight weeks” (Centrelink, 2001a). There 
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are approximately “ 40 activity test breach reasons and 16 administrative breach 
reasons” (Moses & Sharples, 2000, p.6).  
 
What are the Coercive Powers of Centrelink? 
 
There is a strong coercive element within Centrelink aimed at ‘encouraging’ the 
unemployed to move ‘off-benefit’. Richardson (2000) examined the departure 
‘off-benefit’ of recipients who were threatened or obligated with a compulsory 
Centrelink activity, compared to those not threatened. She found “strong 
evidence that the threat of additional activity requirements…has a positive impact 
on the probability of individuals…leaving” New Start Allowance (p. 2).    
 
Richardson (2000) finding tends to support the threat or “stick” hypothesis of 
Centrelink’s policy, however she also found that “empirical evidence seems to 
indicate that exposure to the MOI [Mutual Obligation Initiative] does not alter the 
probability of returning to NSA [New Start Allowance] receipt” (p. 17). This 
supports the argument that welfare recipients have no choice other than to 
accept welfare payments. Moses and Sharples (2000) offered no Departmental 
insight as to where the ‘off benefit’ customers might have gone prior to returning 
to ‘on-benefit’ status. The DEWSRB (2000) Job Network Net Impact study 
acknowledged “that 20% to 31% of individuals who were engaged in various 
programs became ‘off-benefit’”, but it had no information “as to why people left 
these programs” (p. 2).  
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ACOSS (2001a) obtained a copy of INTRALINK , Centrelink’s internal policy 
manual for officer’s guidance. A selection of items follow: 
• “there is no requirement to contact a jobseeker” unless the breach 
recommendation is from a Job Network provider and relates to “failure to 
attend to negotiate an Activity Agreement” 
• “job seekers must not be given benefit of the doubt”, and 
• “where a breach is imposed and a job seeker requests a review, the officer 
“who made the original decision must conduct the … interview” 
(p.6, bolding emphasis is as per original Centrelink document)  
 
Centrelink INTRALINK guidelines advise that breaches should be made without 
consultation with another officer, but a decision made “NOT to impose a breach 
should only be made after consultation with another officer” (ACOSS, 2001a, 
p.7). This directive appears to be at odds with what one would expect, given the 
serious consequences of breaching for individual recipients. The directive 
appears to come very close to a denial of natural justice as outlined by (Moses & 
Sharples, 2000) and indicated by the Ombudsman (McLeod, 2001).  
 
The directive also gives clear insight into Centrelink policy that places pressure 
upon Centrelink officers to apply breaches with some impunity.  
MacDonald and Abello (2001) found there was “increased pressure from the 
Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business 
(DEWRSB)” on the Job Network and Centrelink to increase breaching (p.3). 
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Small changes to this policy, effective July 2002, have recently been announced 
by Minister Vanstone (Vanstone, 2002a, p. 1) and will be detailed later in this 
chapter.  
 
DEWSRB (2001) believed that the mere compulsory aspect of job program 
participation, rather than voluntary participation, “can have an effect on 
behaviour”. DEWSRB suggested that compulsion strategies have a “positive 
motivational effect – or what evaluators call the deterrent effect – on job seekers’ 
continued reliance on income support” because it encourages beneficiaries to 
increase their efforts to find employment, often with success, in preference to 
program participation. DEWRSB also noted a “reporting effect” whereby people 
suspected of claiming benefits inappropriately may “opt to move ‘off-benefit’ 
rather than attend training programs, in order to avoid disclosing job activities 
and earnings” (p.11). These ideas rely on anecdotal evidence and ingrained 
community suspicions. 
 
Government Departments admit having no idea what becomes of people who 
move ‘off-benefit’, for whatever reason, and express having an interest only in 
recording the numerical reduction of people who have moved ‘off-benefit’ 
(DEWRSB, 1999; Moses & Sharples, 2000, p.17). The Commonwealth 
Ombudsman’s 2001 report noted Centrelink was too quick to breach: “Financial 
penalties are imposed on Newstart Allowance Recipients (NSA) who are 
considered not to have complied with activity or administrative requirements”. 
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This non-compliance breach penalty involves reduction or cessation of payment 
for a period of time. “These penalties usually result in extreme financial hardship, 
and should not be imposed without due process” (McLeod, 2001, p.51). 
 
Moses and Sharples (2000) considered “it is probable that the increased breach 
rate is not so much a result of changes to the penalty regime as it is a result of 
the introduction on new activity test requirements” (pp.11- 12). ACOSS (2001b) 
reported  “third time breaches have doubled as a proportion of all Activity Test 
breaches from 7% to 14%” between 1999-00 and 2000-01” (p.9). Third time 
breaches mean cessation of all payment for 8 weeks. ACOSS also pointed out 
that a third time activity breach, when added to the first and second breach, total 
a “fine” or loss of benefit of $3,384, a higher ‘punishment’ than is applied for 
many criminal offences (pp. 3 -11).  
 
The ethical and social implications of Mutual Obligation were examined for The 
Australia Institute by Kinnear (2000), who found that “the ethical foundations of 
the Howard Government’s Mutual Obligation policies do not stand up to scrutiny” 
on a number of grounds. One ground questioned whether “Australia’s system of 
economic management [which] has relied on creating joblessness to sustain 
economic growth” is just. Another ground was that in the context of Australian 
structural unemployment, proponents of Mutual Obligation willingly impose 
requirements on unemployed people. The proponents believe “that unemployed 
people have some control over their joblessness, and therefore a choice to 
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accept or reject welfare benefits”. However the proponents “are mistaken, 
because realistically, there is no choice” (p. V).  
 
How much have rates of beach penalty incidences increased? 
 
The number of Breach penalties issued by Centrelink has trebled in the past 3 
years. ACOSS, (2001b) produced Table 1 (below) that gives a clear picture of 
the increase during the past nearly 4 years. An estimated extrapolation for the full 
year 2000-2001 is shown in Right hand column of Table 1. 
Table 1: Centrelink breaches from 1997 to 2001. 
 
1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 2000-2001 
Type of Breach (July-June) (July-June) (July-June) (July-Feb) (July-June) 
Activity Test Breach 60,981 88,751 177,759 166,485 250,100 
Administrative Breach 59,737 76,741 124,735 65,915 99,000 
Total 120,718 165,492 302,494 232,400 349,100 
Source: Sydney Welfare Rights Centre as cited in (ACOSS, 2001b, p.5). 
 
From within the Department of Family and Community Services, Moses and 
Sharples (2000) reported that “breach numbers increased by 50 per cent 
between 1998-99 and 1999-00 but the number of people breached increased by 
only 30 per cent”. They also reported that generally “fifty per cent of people with 
an activity breach also have an administrative breach. This suggests that a 
growing number of people are having difficulty meeting their requirements on an 
ongoing basis” (p.16).  
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Sleep (2001) observed that “both activity test breaches and administrative 
breaches also increased greatly from 1997 to 2000”. Administrative breaches 
were predominant in 1997, but by 2000 activity breaches were approximately one 
third greater than administrative breaches” (p. 5). These findings accord with the 
ACOSS figures given above, and were confirmed by Pearce et al. (2002). 
 
Does the new Job Network contribute to increased breach incidences? 
 
Moses and Sharples (2000) conceded that “significant rises in the breach rate do 
appear to have coincided with the implementation of major initiatives” such as the 
Job Network, Mutual Obligation and Work for the Dole. “Possibly the clearest link 
which can be drawn is between the establishment of the Job Network in May 
1998 and the subsequent rise in breach numbers” (p. 12).  
 
Moses and Sharples (2000) reported 21 per cent of breaches imposed in 1998-
99 and 24 per cent in 1999-00 were attributable to the Job Network, and in both 
years these figures represented “less than 50 per cent of all breaches 
recommended by the Job Network” (p. 12). Hannon (2002) reported that in 2001, 
46 per cent of breach recommendations issued by the Job Network were 
accepted and applied by Centrelink.   
 
MacDonald and Abello (2001) reported this increase was due to “increased 
pressure” on the Job Network by DEWRSB to recommend breaches more readily 
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(p. 3). However, there had also been implemented “a paperless breach process” 
(Moses & Sharples, 2000, p. 10). A computer generated random referral system 
run by Centrelink, compulsorily directs unemployed people to attend Job Network 
interviews and programs, such as Work for the Dole, as part of activity test 
requirements. The system also generates ‘possible’ breaches automatically, and 
ACOSS (2001b) reported that this referral system has “resulted in a significant 
increase in the number of breaches related to these programs” (p. 3, italics 
added). DEWRSB (2001) admitted that its “auto-referral process for JST [Job 
Start Training] supports compliance effects” (p.10). 
 
Interestingly, Centrelink complained to the Productivity Commission about these 
automated systems, claiming they were inefficient, because 54 per cent of 
breach recommendations received from the Job Network had to be rejected due 
to lack of evidence or due process (Hannon, 2002). From a different perspective, 
the Commonwealth Ombudsman noted that there was indeed increased 
pressure on the Job Network to apply breaches to customers without evidence or 
due process, and such recommendations were being readily accepted and 
processed by Centrelink (McLeod, 2001).  
 
MacDonald and Abello (2001) reported that the third round of Government 
contracts for the Job Network included a “sharper focus on meeting DEWRSB 
key performance indicators”, including increased breaching levels. This pressure 
created an “ethical dilemma of the transfer of government responsibilities to 
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agencies in becoming more responsible for the policing of client’s job search 
activities” (pp. 3-6). Individuals who are breached on the recommendation of a 
Job Network member cannot appeal to that Job Network member, because 
Centrelink has the legislated delegation and controls the complex appeals 
process initially (Sleep, 2001). The Ombudsman and ACOSS found breaches 
were made without ‘due process’ (McLeod, 2001, p.52; ACOSS, 2001a).  
 
Moses and Sharples (2000) referred to the importance for Centrelink officers 
“generally” to contact customers before breaching them,  “to ensure that the 
person is given the opportunity to provide information that may explain why they 
were unable to meet their requirements”. This is because, when determining a 
breach, including those recommended by third parties such as Job Network 
providers, the process needs to be “both consistent with principles of natural 
justice and legislative requirements” under the Social Security Act (pp. 6-7).  
 
Moses and Sharples (2000) noted a person should only be taken to have failed 
the activity test or administrative requirements if they did so “without reasonable 
excuse”. It follows that “a determination that a person has so failed cannot 
therefore be made until the reason for the failure has been established” (pp.6-7).  
Due process and ethics will be revisited in later chapters. 
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Does Government rhetoric contribute to increased breach incidences? 
 
Rhetoric plays an important part in justifying and promoting the compliance 
process. Odgers (2001) quoted Employment Services Minister Brough 
discussing the number of unemployment benefit recipients who ‘opt to have their 
unemployment benefits cancelled’. 20,700 people in 1999-2000 apparently went 
“off benefit” in preference to participating in compulsory job training courses, 
because the Government was “flushing out the dole cheats” (p. 8).  
 
Connotations of the human bodily waste disposal system were followed up with 
the Minister’s ideological notion that  “compliance is a very strong motivator and 
obviously some of these people either couldn’t be bothered finding a job or were 
already in paid employment and therefore couldn’t attend the full time courses. 
Either way they’ve now been flushed out of the system and are no longer 
collecting payments they’re not entitled to” (Odgers, 2001, p. 8), implying there 
could have been no other circumstances under which people move ‘off-benefit’. 
 
ACOSS (2001a) believed that “constant ‘job snobs’ type comments by 
Government Ministers have meant that many Centrelink officers feel they have 
been granted political license to harass job-seekers” (p.7) by increasing breach 
rates. This is not a new phenomenon. Windschuttle (1980) reported that the 
Fraser Coalition Government quickly began to pressure the then (1976) 
Commonwealth Employment Service “to take a get-tough policy” against 
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suspected “dole bludgers” and unemployed people considered inappropriately 
dressed or groomed (pp. 218-219).  
 
Bridgman and Davis (2000) found that this kind of interpretation risked program 
objectives being “lost amid bureaucratic politics” (p. 120). Minister Newman’s 
declarations that jobless welfare recipients are now “welfare dependant” and 
need to be “helped off-benefit” (Newman, 2000, p.11) continues to influence 
bureaucrats. ACOSS (2001a) observed that for Centrelink, the “notion of social 
security legislation as beneficial legislation” had disappeared (p.7). See also 
Johnstone (2001) on the toughening of Mutual Obligation requirements. 
  
Moses and Sharples (2000) acknowledged continuing rises in numbers of people 
being breached, and suggested this could be due to Centrelink staff being “more 
willing to impose breaches” since the advent of graduated breach penalties. 
Recipients would not now lose total payment for their first offence. As self-
described ‘hard liners’, the authors wryly noted that increased breach numbers 
were probably not what lobbyists for abolition of first penalty total payment 
cessation had in mind (pp. 11-12).  
 
Minister Vanstone continued the rhetoric; “people receiving welfare payments get 
exactly what they are entitled – no more and no less. That’s why compliance 
measures are necessary” because they saved taxpayers some 550 million 
dollars over the past three years”. Although not highlighted, this amount covers 
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all welfare areas, not just unemployment. The Minister continued; “while the vast 
majority of people who receive welfare payments are honest and entitled to those 
payments, there is a small number of people who still seek to cheat their fellow 
Australians. These people will be caught” (Vanstone, 2002b, pp.1-2; Cole, 2002).  
 
To balance the rhetoric on welfare fraud, Sleep (2001) reported (citing ACOSS) 
that welfare fraud represented  “less than 0.1%” of customers were “found to 
have fraudulently obtained benefits” (p. 4). Of approximately 6 million welfare 
recipients who currently receive a payment from Centrelink, this proportion 
represents a minuscule total of some 6000 individuals. Minister Vanstone’s 
‘declared’ savings for taxpayers over 3 years averaged $183 million per year 
(Vanstone, 2002b, pp. 1-2; Cole, 2002). 
 
The rhetoric on welfare fraud, which justifies “catching dole bludgers” to save  
$183 million annually that taxpayers are “cheated” out of, may be better 
understood when evaluated against a quantum reported by the Taxation 
Commissioner. An estimated minimum of approximately $5.4 billion (up to a 
maximum estimate of $20.7 billion) per annum has been ‘cheated’ from the 
taxation office by taxpayers operating in the income earning environment and the 
‘black’ economy  (Madigan, 2002). Smith (1993) noted: “There was a perception, 
not altogether unfounded,  that many people were not paying their [tax] dues”. 
For wage and salary earners “it was ‘pay-as-you-earn’, for many others of greater 
means, it was ‘pay-as-you-like’” (p. 110).  
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The literature suggests that ‘welfare cheating’ and ‘dole bludging’ generates far 
greater public opprobrium than does ‘tax cheating’, regardless of the real cost to 
community. However, the opportunism that politicians exhibit when inciting this 
opprobrium, to divert attention away from other pressing political issues, is well 
understood (Editorial, 2002, p. 10).  See also (Boreham & Hall, 1993; Quiggin, 
2001,  pp. 11-12).   
 
Does developing “policy on the run” increase breach incidences? 
 
Although the slogan ‘work for the dole’ was politically popular, “no corresponding 
policy proposal existed” at the time of Howard’s 1997 Work for the Dole program 
announcement, which came as a surprise. As Opposition Leader Howard had 
specifically rejected Work for the Dole type programs prior to his election. After 
election, the quick implementation of the program was considered a “political 
imperative” so that the Government could be seen to be ‘doing something’ about 
the ‘unemployment problem’ (Burgess et al., 1998, p. 2; Quiggin, 2001, pp. 11-
12). DEWRSB (1999) admitted as much when evaluating the “Work for the Dole” 
pilot program. Mutual Obligation policies continue to evolve as ‘policy on the run’. 
 
There has been considerable controversy surrounding Centrelink’s interpretation 
of changing Government policy regarding breaching, particularly the application 
of more costly activity breach penalties in instances more suited to application of 
the less costly administrative breach penalties. This trend apparently developed 
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as a Centrelink response to toughened demands on job seekers, incorporated in 
the new Preparing for Work Agreements introduced by the Howard Government 
in July 2000 (ACOSS, 2001b, p. 8; MacDonald & Abello, 2001; McLeod, 2001). 
 
A groundswell of opinion has created a political imperative for the Howard 
Government to review unemployment welfare policy relating to breaching. The 
release of the report; “Breaching the Safety Net” by ACOSS (2001b) generated 
sufficient pressure to prompt Minister Anthony to announce that Centrelink would 
examine its breaching practices to ensure efficacy and suitability (Anthony, 2001; 
Moscaritolo & Keim, 2001).   
 
A Consortium of not-for-profit welfare organisations announced that it was 
inappropriate for Centrelink to review itself. The consortium commissioned an 
independent inquiry to review and report on breaches and penalties in the 
Centrelink system, chaired by Professor Dennis Pearce, an ex Commonwealth 
Ombudsman (ACOSS, 2001a; Horan, 2001; Raper, 2001). Demonstrating 
ongoing development of ‘policy on the run’, Minister Vanstone pre-empted the 
Pearce inquiry when announcing changes to Centrelink breaching practices, 
applicable from July 2002. The changes resulted from 26 Centrelink 
recommendations that arose from Minister Anthony’s inquiry.  
 
Minister Vanstone expressed satisfaction at being able to “look after our most 
vulnerable job seekers, while keeping the breaching regime tough for those who 
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deliberately try to cheat the system”. The Minister agreed that the ‘old’ [still 
existing] system did have a problem, as it could be “too harsh on vulnerable 
people”, (the deserving) who have a mental illness, are homeless, or are “with 
drug or alcohol problems” (Vanstone, 2002a, p. 1). 
 
However the solution is likely to exacerbate the problem and create further 
breaching type hardship, because Minister Vanstone’s focus remained on 
techniques for ‘catching’ non-genuine job seekers, who would now “face 
additional scrutiny” to ensure that “a robust mutual obligation system still exists” 
(Vanstone, 2002a, pp. 2-4).   
 
From July 2002, Centrelink can suspend totally all payments, and then restore 
them, for people judged to be “at risk” of being breached. Unlike the current 
practice of reducing payments until a third breach, this stoppage of payment is 
intended to ensure that people must “come in for a face to face assessment” or 
stay ‘off-benefit’.  As Minister Vanstone put it; “an interview will be the last thing a 
cheater wants” (Vanstone, 2002a, pp. 2-4).  
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
Choosing a qualitative survey study. 
 
The primary research objective was to explore the lived experience of people 
who have received one or more breach penalties from Centrelink to see if their 
experiences matched the expectation and intent of the breaching policy as 
implemented by the Howard Coalition Government. 
 
Time and resource limitations dictated that utilising extensive statistical or 
quantitative research techniques would not be a sensible use of available data. 
This is predominately because of the limited sample size that could realistically 
be collected and the fact that the responses gathered are essentially people’s 
accounts of their individual perceptions of what has been happening to them 
(Burns, 1990, pp. 9-11). 
 
Therefore a qualitative style of intensive survey questionnaire format was 
chosen. Neuman (1997) believed that a qualitative inductive study need not be 
greatly concerned with variables, reliability, statistics, hypotheses, replication or 
scales (p. 327). Burns (1990) discussed the complexity of human life when 
rejecting any need for quantitative numerical classifications, because such 
classifications would be unable to account for complexities which are the 
“determining factors to understand” when expanding behavioural knowledge (pp. 
9-11). 
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Marshall and Rossman (1989) argued that the development process for 
conducting inductive qualitative research is difficult, without any data being 
initially available. However initial ‘data’ for this research and questionnaire 
construction existed, in the form of Government statements of intent regarding 
Mutual Obligation for unemployed welfare recipients and a wealth of studies 
about unemployment, income support, activity testing and breaching.  
 
Neuman (1997) noted “researchers rarely know the specifics of data analysis 
when they begin a project”,  but considered that by “blending together empirical 
evidence and abstract concepts” in qualitative research, the researcher would be 
able to divide explanations into two categories: “highly unlikely and plausible” and 
be satisfied by “supplying supportive evidence” in the form of survey data  
(pp.  419-420). 
 
Blaikie (1993) cited Popper’s ‘six point’ steps of a deductive strategy for 
conducting qualitative research which closely resembles the research study 
documented herein. Beginning with framing a conjecture, that could form a 
‘theory’, a conclusion could be deduced from the literature. Appropriate data is 
then gathered to test the conclusion. If the test fails; “data are not consistent… 
the ‘theory’ must be false”. If the conclusion ‘passes’, that is data is consistent, 
the ‘theory’ is temporarily supported, thus “it is corroborated, not proved to be 
true” (p. 145, italics in original). 
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Survey instrument design. 
(A copy of the complete survey form is attached at Appendix One). 
 
Thirty-three questions were prepared. Four demographic questions, designed to 
identify gender, age grouping above or below 30 years and basic living 
arrangements within relationships, were included. Remaining questions were 
framed to elicit data about breaching experiences and outcomes for individual 
respondents. The questions were designed to reflect and test Government policy 
statements regarding objectives, intent and expectations. Neuman (1997) argued 
that “in qualitative research, ideas and evidence are mutually interdependent” for 
subsequent analysis (p. 421), as did Burns (1990, p. 252). 
 
An anonymous format was used to guarantee confidentiality. Convention was 
followed to ensure that survey forms could be comprehensibly coded and held 
available for subsequent review by others (Babbie, 1995). The questions were 
designed to elicit responses indicative of respondent’s lived experiences. 
Questions asked about reasons, or lack of explanation, for breaches being given. 
There were questions about;  perceived fairness; perceived pressures to leave 
welfare benefit programs; pressures to search harder for work; knowledge of 
(and use of) rights of appeal; receipt of notice of pending breach; increase or 
decrease of self-esteem; improved job prospects; greater or lesser intention to 
comply with Centrelink requirements and changes in desirability levels of 
individual accommodation.  
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The researcher understands the importance of retaining social meaning and 
need to identify the significance of that meaning by “remaining aware of the 
social context in which the research is being conducted” (Neuman, 1997, p. 331). 
Therefore, it was decided to include in the questionnaire some open-ended 
questions, offering space for respondents to express in writing their experiences 
in their words.  
 
Ammon-Gaberson and Piantanida (1998) stressed the importance of logically 
developing survey questionnaires “in order to derive meaning from the data…” 
(p. 160). Babbie (1995) argued that validity is generally high in qualitative 
research because open-ended questions provide richness of insight that “clearly 
identifies concepts by giving detailed illustration” (p. 300), which also “measures 
what it purports to measure” (Neuman, 1997, p. 331).  
 
Some questions were framed because the literature indicated that greater 
numbers of people were being breached (ACOSS, 2001b), and more people 
were receiving multiple breaches (Moses & Sharples, 2000). Further, the penalty 
cost to individuals was increasing, because Centrelink had reportedly changed its 
definitions of administrative breaches, thereby allowing more frequent 
applications of higher cost activity breaches (ACOSS, 2001b; Sleep, 2001).  
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Questions were also framed to facilitate data processing and second order 
analysis, to aid identification of similarities, dissimilarities and universals, and 
assist development of generalised understanding (Babbie, 1995). 
 
Discussion on limitations of the research method. 
 
Some weaknesses of the survey approach used include the fact that the 
emphasis of the survey is on individuals who have been breached, and there is 
no control or comparison group. Thus the information cannot be generalised for 
use in a broader context, without further data collection. Wider collection could 
have enabled a more thorough evaluation of any resulting implications, with 
possibly more telling conclusions (Caulley, 1992). The results obtained suggest 
that this is an area that would justify further research, particularly in ascertaining 
what happens to people who are breached, compared with those who are not. 
 
The small survey sample size cannot justify sophisticated statistical analysis. 
Indeed, there could be danger that if extensive statistical analysis were applied to 
answers from the questionnaire, in an effort to claim ‘scientific/statistical’ 
specificity, such effort would not provide greater accuracy beyond what was 
measured, which was the respondent’s answers to specific survey questions.  
 
Additionally, the same answer by more than one person to the same question 
may not be an indicator of identical lived experience, because people experience 
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differential emotions and outcomes to similar trauma. Merton (1936) believed 
such experiences are always “different” (p. 899). Differential experience is further 
complicated by the fact that language used to express ‘lived experience’ may, 
although the words used are the same, still have different meaning for different 
respondents (Babbie, 1995;  Burns, 1990;  Neuman, 1997).  
 
Survey respondents overwhelmingly represented continuing customers of 
Centrelink. The choice of survey locations was unlikely to attract large numbers 
of people who had been breached, but were no longer Centrelink customers. 
However the use of a standard survey form, collected from three separate 
locations, does assist reliability and validity. Hammersley (1992) considered 
reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned 
to the same category by different observers (respondents) on different occasions.  
 
Hammersley (1990) believed that validity meant truth, interpreted as the extent to 
which an account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers. 
The survey form was developed by the researcher to explore individual 
respondent reactions to breaching phenomena described in the literature, in a 
consistent format. Survey results evidenced a ‘degree of consistency’. However it 
was noticeable that in the reportedly less affluent area in which Nundah 
Centrelink office is located (Wilson, 2002), respondents appeared to be breached 
more often, with higher penalty costs, and they were more likely to have less 
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desirable accommodation after being breached. These results will be considered 
further in Chapters Five and Six.  
 
Hall (1998) discussed issues of reliability and validity in his research on the Work 
for the Dole program, citing Chadwick, Bahr and Albrecht’s 1984 comments 
about survey participants. When participants are regarded as taking part in a 
“socially disapproved activity” of being unemployed, data collected in this type of 
survey situation “has the propensity to elicit purposeful misinformation”. This is 
because “the unemployed are aware of mandatory requirements and government 
surveillance” (p. 22). However, it is expected that data collected in this survey 
and study reflects reasonable accuracy, with minimum ‘protest’ type 
misinformation, because the researcher presented in a non-protest-like manner.  
 
The researcher presented as a middle aged, middle class, conservatively 
dressed Caucasian male. The survey presentation incorporated a well-designed 
questionnaire, on University letterhead, which explained purpose and 
professional signage, as recommended by (Neuman, 1997, Chapter 14).  
(Copies of the materials appear at Appendices One and Two). In the event, more 
than 100 people apparently felt non-threatened, as they eagerly approached the 
researcher asking “where do I sign?”.  Presumably they wished to ‘add their vote’ 
against disliked Centrelink practices.   
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To further enhance reliability and validity for this study, several other independent 
studies will be compared and contrasted in Chapters Four and Five. Marshall and 
Rossman (1989) recommended a strategic research choice to enhance 
generaliseability of a study by utilising “triangulation”, defined as “the act of 
bringing more than one source of data to bear on a single point” (p. 146). Burns 
(1990) also argued the usefulness of triangulation, when applying different data 
sets to confirm and build internal validation. The literature review uncovered data 
on the prevalence and severity of breaching, that can be triangulated. See 
(ACOSS, 2001b; Moses & Sharples, 2000; Pearce et al., 2002;  Sleep, 2001).  
 
Data collection procedure. 
  
Data collection took place on five days, within a three-week period of April, 2002. 
The researcher took up a position on the public footpath directly in front of three 
Centrelink offices. Two days were spent at the Mitchelton branch, two days at 
Chermside, and one day at Nundah. The branches are located in the ‘northern’ 
areas of urban Brisbane. They were selected because their locations were 
convenient. Consideration was given to surveying other Brisbane Centrelink 
offices, particularly those located in areas publicly labeled as having greater 
socio-economic disadvantage, with possibly higher incidences of breaching. 
However, the research purpose was to study how the lives of those breached 
were affected, not the phenomena or volume of breaching incidents. Babbie 
(1995) reminded researchers to remain focused on their purpose (pp. 102-103). 
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Members of the public in the vicinity of the selected Centrelink offices were 
considered to be potential respondents. They could see two large (size A1) signs 
presented at a small table attended by the researcher. (A copy of the signs 
appears at Appendix Two). The signs invited participation in a survey if people  
“have been breached by Centrelink”. When people approached the researcher, 
they were advised that only those aged 18 years and over, who had received at 
least one breach from Centrelink, would be eligible to complete a ‘tick the box 
type’ survey about their experience. No spruiking activities or financial 
inducements were made. After people had voluntarily chosen to participate, and 
completed the survey form, they were offered a ‘mintie’ by the researcher, from 
an open packet laying on the table, and thanked. 
 
Initial data collection and field observation. 
 
As noted, more than 100 people approached the researcher as a result of the 
signage. Most of them expressed dissatisfaction and anger toward Centrelink 
practices, most commonly with the complaint that Centrelink “just don’t listen” to 
them. This comment ‘fits’ with literature reports of Centrelink not being fair and 
not giving the benefit of the doubt, which will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
Fifty-six individuals qualified the criteria of age and having been breached, and 
completed the survey. The standard questionnaire format increased 
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comparability of data, because all respondents had the same response sequence 
and opportunity, mostly without input from the researcher. (In 5 or 6 instances, 
the researcher was asked for assistance, interpretation or clarification). The large 
majority completed the survey independently.  
 
The independent ability of respondents to complete the survey form was 
reflected in the writing and spelling standard of responses. They were of higher 
standard than anticipated during questionnaire design. Possibly the method of 
recruiting people, using written signs without spruiking, pre-ordained that only 
reasonably fluent readers would volunteer to participate.  
 
The observations noted above, fit with the idea that this study is also a form of 
field research. The researcher has met the survey respondents, liased with 
various authorities and conducted correspondence, meetings and discussions 
with a variety of Centrelink Managers. It is appropriate that this ‘field data’ is 
included in this study. Babbie (1995) argued that “one of the key strengths of field 
research is the comprehensiveness of perspective it gives the researcher” (p. 
280). See also (Ammon-Gaberson & Piantanida,1998; Burns, 1990; Neuman, 
1997; Weisberg, Krosnick, & Bowen, 1996).  
 
For example, some comments made by various Centrelink managers appeared, 
to this researcher, to exhibit attitudinal thinking reflecting the ideological rhetoric 
of the Howard Government. Some of this ‘thinking’ has been reported (and 
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inferred) from the literature review presented in this study. As a practical and 
ethical consideration, the researcher also wrote to the Chief Executive Officer of 
Centrelink, advising of the proposed survey activity. (See copy at Appendix 
Four). No response had been received during the conduct of the survey, however 
Centrelink (Canberra) eventually advised by letter that their Brisbane Area 
Manager had been notified. 
 
At the first survey location, Mitchelton, it was apparent to the researcher that 
Centrelink staff had not been alerted to the survey activity. Staff appeared at 
doorways and windows, exhibiting obvious interest, curiosity and concern. An 
Acting Manager approached the researcher after twenty minutes. She perused 
proffered documentation, ethical clearance and University approvals, then 
appeared to relax slightly when commenting that  “no one else was game to 
approach you”.  Accepting a copy of the survey instrument, she advised the 
Commonwealth had ‘move on’ power, and a senior manager from Brisbane office 
was “coming out” to see the researcher.  
 
In due course the Business Manager, Area Brisbane, approached in a non-
confrontational manner. Clearly she had perused the survey instrument, and had 
received a briefing from the Acting Manager. Her major concerns were that there 
should be no placards, protests or press gatherings. She stated her initial report 
indicated there was protest activity involving placards taking place, and 
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expressed surprise that upon arrival, she saw “only one individual, standing at a 
small table under a tree, like at those polling booths”.  
 
The misunderstandings and concerns exhibited by Centrelink personnel in 
communications with the researcher suggest an elevated level of awareness and 
understanding by Centrelink staff exists about breaching policies. Staff 
apparently understand Mutual Obligation activities are controversial, are resented 
by Centrelink customers and are subject to ‘outside’ scrutiny. Concern was 
expressed that public protest activity could readily erupt, creating “political 
problems” for Centrelink. The Business Manager asked the researcher to give 
notice to other Centrelink Branches to be visited, and provided names and direct 
telephone numbers to facilitate this notice. 
 
Consequently Centrelink Managers at Chermside and Nundah were forewarned 
of the survey. Some comments made to the researcher by Centrelink managers 
are included here, as a part of the study, highlighting expressed managerial 
attitudes. For example, telephone communication with the Chermside Manager 
was co-operative, as she had been expecting the call. Nevertheless, she 
expressed concern about what form the survey might take, as “this Centrelink 
office is one of multiple tenancies in this complex, and a very unpopular one, 
because of the nature of our clients, as you would understand”.  
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The ‘nature of our clients’ was taken by the researcher to mean unpleasant, 
deviant people of low social standing and acceptability. However this research 
study was not designed to follow Babbie's (1995) suggestion that “often, careful 
examination of deviant cases in field research can yield important insights into 
normal patterns of social behaviour (p. 303, italics in original).  
 
When telephoned, the Nundah Branch Manager confirmed to the researcher that 
she was aware of the pending survey. Canberra had directed, via Queensland 
Management, that this survey was in progress. The researcher’s name had been 
disseminated and an instruction had been issued that the survey should proceed, 
provided compliance with Centrelink’s national guidelines for the management of 
‘customer behavior’ was maintained during the survey. Tellingly, this researcher 
was described as “benign and friendly”.  
 
Ethical considerations. 
 
Due to the public nature of the intended method of attracting potential 
respondents for the survey, the researcher visited the local regional headquarters 
of the Queensland Police Service and the local Ward Office of Brisbane City 
Council, to ascertain that the collection method proposed would be lawful. (File-
note recording visits attached at Appendix Three). As previously mentioned, the 
Centrelink Chief Executive Officer was advised by letter of the proposed survey. 
(See Appendix Four).  
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A completed Check-list for Human Research activity, including signed approvals 
from the Head of School of Humanities and Human Services and the Study 
Supervisor, was submitted to the Secretary of the University Human Research 
Ethics Committee (UHREC). The Secretary confirmed exemption from full ethical 
clearance and authorised immediate commencement of the research 
electronically. (The E-mail appears at Appendix Five). In order to clarify the 
methodology of this study further, the complete survey response tallies, with 
comment, follows in Chapter Four.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: SURVEY RESPONSE TALLIES  
 
Initial survey response tallies and comment. 
The findings of the survey will be presented in Chapter Five. What follows here is 
representative information drawn from the initial tallies of responses to the 33 
survey questions, in sequence, that were given in the 56 completed 
questionnaires, together with some preliminary findings from secondary analysis 
of data.  Data was processed in an Excel computer program, which facilitated 
comparison, interrogation, extrapolation and production of illustrative graphics 
included herein. (The complete survey form appears at Appendix One).  
 
1: Are you aged 18 years or older?  100%, all 56 people responded ‘Yes’. 
 
2: Have you ever been breached by Centrelink?  100% ticked ‘Yes’  (56). 
 
3: Are you under 30 years old?  54% reported ‘Yes’ (30) and 46% ‘No’ (26). 
 
4: Are you male or female? 71% reported Male (40) and 29% Female (16). 
7 females reported being aged under 30 compared with 23 males. 
 
It was expected that young males would be represented more often than other 
groups, because activity tests subject to Mutual Obligation were initially targeted 
at young people (Richardson, 2000). Young people continue to be targeted for 
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special treatment by Government (Dullroy, 2002), and young males appear to be 
breached more often than other people, within a shorter period of benefit receipt 
(Moses & Sharples, 2000). 
 
Figure 1: Survey breach numbers by gender. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A breakdown of age and gender response, indicated that in 1999, of 17 people 
breached,  7 were under 30 and 5 of those were male. In 2000, of 17 people 
breached,  10 were under 30 and 9 of those were male. In 2001, of 25 people 
breached, 16 were under 30 and 12 of those were male. In the first four months 
of 2002, 28 people indicated that they had been breached in that year, and of 
those, 18 were under 30 and of the 18, there were 12 males.   
This study survey triangulated well with breach figures reported by Moses and 
Sharples (2000, p.17) and Richardson (2000) who found younger people, 
particularly males, are much more likely to be breached than older people.  
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Figure 2: Includes representation of 4 months of 2002 right column. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A factor that could contribute to this result is the ‘recentness’ of the breach. 
Resentment against being breached may tend to diminish over time, (not unlike 
remembering parking tickets) so that those more recently breached may have 
had greater likelihood of approaching the researcher to be included. 
 
5: How would you best describe your living arrangements? 
 
25% were ‘single, living alone’ (14).  28% were ‘single, sharing group house’ 
(16). 14% were ‘living with partner’ (7). 11% were ‘living with partner and 
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children’ (6). 11% were ‘Single with children’ (6) and 11% reported ‘other 
arrangements’ (6).  
 
Approximately 64% were “single”, representing 36 individuals out of 56. 
 
6: When you were breached, what Centrelink payment were you getting? 
 
Several people indicated receipt of more than one payment. 37 people received 
‘Newstart’, 11 received ‘Youth Allowance’, eight received ‘Parenting Payment’ 
and one received ‘Partner Allowance’. Three people received ‘Disability Support 
Pension’, one received ‘Austudy’ and two received ‘Carer Pension’.  
 
Newstart was nominated three times more often than any other program. 89% of 
respondents  (50) were in programs subject to activity tests.  
7: How long were you on that payment before getting breached?  
 
18 people reported being breached at 1 - 6 months. 18 reported at 7-12 months.  
9 reported being breached after 1 year and 11 people after more than 2 years.  
 
64% respondents (36) reported that they were breached whilst on a benefit for 
less than one year, compared with 36% people (20) who were breached after 
one year. Secondary analysis showed that in 1999, eight respondents received a 
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breach within one year. In 2000 there were 11, in 2001 there were 15 and in the 
elapsed four months of 2002, there were 23 people. 
 
The number breached within one year tend to corroborate reported breach rates 
being increasingly applied earlier within benefit programs (ACOSS, 2001b; 
Pearce et al., 2002; Sleep, 2001).  
 
8: What is your main activity currently?  
 
Several respondents indicated more than one activity, rendering percentages 
meaningless. Nine people were in ‘Part Time Work’, thirty-four were ‘Looking for 
work’, eight were ‘Studying’, nine indicated ‘Home Duties’, none were ‘Retired’ 
and eight selected ‘Other’.  
 
 
9: In which years were you breached?  
 
Many respondents indicated multiple years, 17 people indicated 1999, 17 
indicated 2000,  25 indicated 2001 and 28 indicated the first four months of 2002. 
 
This response corroborates the observation, derived from the literature, that 
there is now increased Government pressure upon Centrelink and the Job 
Network to increase frequency levels of breaching. The pressure is partly based 
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on the belief that increased sanctions will discourage ‘welfare dependency’ 
(Newman, 2000).   
 
10: How many times have you been breached in the last 4 years? 
 
46% of respondents (26) indicated ‘Once’. 28% or (16) indicated ‘Twice’. 13% or 
(7) indicated  ‘3 Times’ and 13%, or (7) indicated ‘More than 3 Times’. 
56%, more than half, had had more than one breach, which will be discussed.  
 
11: If you have had what Centrelink calls an Administrative Breach, please 
tick the box showing number of times:  
 
‘Once’ was indicated 27 times, ‘Twice’ 9 times and ‘More than Twice’ 7 times. 
 
12: If you have had what Centrelink calls an Activity Breach, please tick the 
box showing number of times:  
 
‘Once’ was indicated 20 times,  ‘Twice’ 12 times and ‘Three times or more’ 
received 3 indications.  
 
The answers to questions 11 and 12 probably reflect respondent confusion about 
breach type, as they unexpectedly record some 66 administrative breaches 
compared with 54 activity breaches. This apparent difference between responses 
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to types of breaches in this survey is discussed in detail in Chapter 5, pp.73-75 
where it is established that the majority of breaches were activity breaches as 
would be expected (Sleep, 2001, p.6).  
 
At first sight the answers to questions 11 and 12 were worrying because if the 
answers regarding the type of breach ‘as named’ were accurate, then this 
suggested that these 56 survey respondents were somehow different to the 
entire breached population. As reported in the literature, more activity breaches 
than administrative breaches are issued (ACOSS, 2001b, p.5; Moses & 
Sharples, 2000, p. 8).  
 
13: What were the penalty or penalties that you received?  
Twelve people reported a breach resulting in ‘Nil payment for two weeks’, ten 
reported a breach resulting in ‘16% reduction for 13 weeks’. 21 people received 
an ‘18% reduction for 26 weeks, 14 had a ‘24% reduction for 26 weeks’. Eight 
reported “Nil payment for 8 weeks’ and eight people indicated a different breach 
penalty. 
 
As mentioned at Question 12, some respondents appeared not know what their 
breach penalties were, or simply responded to the first category choice offered, 
which was administrative breach. A secondary analysis of Question 13 answers 
is illustrated in Chapter Five, page 74.   
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14: Did Centrelink give you any reasons why they gave you a penalty 
breach?  
 
73% responded by indicating ‘Yes’ (41), 16% indicated ‘No’ (9) and 11% or six 
people ‘Don’t know’. 
                                          
15: If you answered Yes, do you remember any reasons Centrelink gave 
you?  
 
 
An ‘open’ question; 42 written responses were recorded. Several people 
recorded multiple reasons. Category type summaries were developed for the 
written answers and the summary response counts follow: 
Moved to area with fewer jobs (1). Wrong advice given by Centrelink (4). Failed 
to attend Job Network as required (4). Failed to comply with Activity Agreement 
(4). No mail or advice was received (5). Employer Certificate forms not 
satisfactorily completed (5).  Failed to return form on time (6). Income declaration 
was unsatisfactory together with overpayment reclaim problems (6). Failed to 
complete Job Diary satisfactorily (6). Failed to attend scheduled Centrelink 
interview (7). 
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The above categories differ slightly to those used by ACOSS (2001b, p.8) and 
Moses and Sharples (2000, p.8), however overall triangulation of the results 
produced similar results across the studies. 
 
16:  When you got breached, did you think that Centrelink was being fair to 
you?  
95% or 53 people indicated that Centrelink was not being fair.  3% (2) indicated 
‘Yes’ and one indicated ‘Don’t know’. 
 
17: Do you feel that Centrelink puts you under pressure to make you go off 
benefits permanently? 
 
79% responded ‘Yes’ (44 people), 9% responded ‘No’, (5) and a further 12%  or 
(7) responded ‘Don’t know’.  
 
18: Did you realise that you could appeal against Centrelink’s decision to 
give you a breach penalty?    
52% or 29 people responded ‘Yes’.  43% ‘No’ (24) and 5% ‘Don’t know’ (3). 
 
19: Did you appeal your breach penalty decision to Centrelink?  
39% responded ‘Yes’ (22 people), 56% or (31) reported ‘No’. 5% or (3) reported 
‘Don’t know’. 
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20: If you appealed, was your appeal successful? 
Nine people indicated ‘Yes’, 15 indicated ‘No’ and 5 indicated ‘Don’t know’. 
 
21: If you appealed, how long did your appeal process take?    
Fourteen respondents indicated the appeal process took weeks, ranging from 
one week to seven, averaging approximately three weeks. Eight respondents 
indicated the process took months. One respondent reported an unlikely 24 
months, another 15 months.  Disregarding these two extended periods, an 
average appeal wait-time of approximately 6 weeks. However, when including 
the two longer time respondents mentioned, an average appeal process time of 
just over 11 weeks is calculated for all survey respondents, which does is not 
appear “highly unlikely” as defined by (Neuman, 1997, pp.419-420).   
 
The tallies at Question 20 and 21 do not appear to ‘gel’ with the number who said 
they ‘appealed’. It may be that some appeals were still proceeding and other 
respondents were confused about their queries as opposed to an actual appeal. 
The appeal process is very complex (some respondents expressed the 
uselessness of attempting it) which may have added to the apparent confusion 
recorded. 
 
22: If your breaches meant that Centrelink stopped all benefit payments to 
you, how long was it before you re-applied to Centrelink for another 
benefit? 
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Fourteen people indicated periods of weeks, the average delay representing 
approximately five weeks. The range ran from two to 16 weeks. Two respondents 
reported three and four months respectively, therefore averaging approximately 
15 weeks between them. However of the 16 respondents, only 12 actually 
reported a complete loss of benefit, and their average time waited before 
reapplying was 6.5 weeks.  
 
Without alternative income, this time period represents considerable hardship 
(McLeod, 2001). Interestingly, only two of the twelve people above who had all 
benefit stopped, reported needing to leave their accommodation for less 
desirable accommodation at Question 32. Of these twelve, six were under thirty 
years of age and six were over thirty, eight were male and four were female. As 
will be seen, many respondents needed to move into less desirable 
accommodation, because their benefit payment was reduced, not because it 
was stopped. 
23: Did you expect to get breached before the penalty was actually given to 
you by Centrelink?  (Did you see it coming?)     
 
91%, (51 respondents) indicated ‘No’. 5% or (3) indicated ‘Yes’ and 4% or (2) 
‘Didn’t know’. 
 
Question 23 carried an “Any Comment?” section. 14 written responses were 
recorded, including two from the three people indicating ‘expecting a breach’. 
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(One knew a document was unavailable, the other believed he was being 
‘targeted’). Responses from the 12 people who did not expect a breach included 
three who believed Centrelink was mistaken. Three people reported receiving no 
advice, but their payment was changed. Three people believed their forms were 
completed satisfactorily. Two reported receiving no warning or ‘clue’. One person 
was unhappy with a Job Network agency’s unhelpful ‘dobbing’ to Centrelink. 
 
24: After you received a breach penalty, did you get any help from others?  
Multiple responses included 23 people indicating ‘Family’, 14 ‘Friends’ and 5 
indicated ‘Welfare Rights Group’. 7 nominated ‘Your Church’, 15 ‘Welfare Charity 
Agency’ and 7 indicated ‘Other’.  
 
Family was the highest called upon ‘help’ category, 39% of all respondents (22 
people) of whom 15 were under thirty years of age. The call on ‘charity’ appears 
to be increasing. ‘Charity’ recorded 6 indications in 1999, 2000 and 2001. 
However in the elapsed 4 months of 2002, eight people indicated needing 
charity, tending to corroborate the growing numbers reported by welfare 
organisations (ACOSS, 2001b; Nevile, 2001). See figure 3 below and Chapter 
Five. 
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Figure 3: Categories of assistance sought by respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25: Do you think the threat of a breach penalty made you look harder for a 
job? 
 
34% of people responded ‘Yes’ (19), 57% ‘No’ (32) and 9% ‘Didn’t know’ (5).  
 
Question 25 also provided space for written comment; 22 written comments were 
recorded, none came from the five people who indicated ‘Don’t know’ at this 
question. Seven comments were from respondents who had indicated ‘Yes’, 
including four who reported “no money - to look for jobs”, two implied willingness 
to do ‘anything’ to get money (one of these wrote “yes, went out and sold drugs”). 
Another was motivated “to get away from incompetent [Centrelink] people”.  
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There were 15 comments from people indicating ‘No’. Of these; four people 
reported looking for work or working part time “anyway”, three were full time 
students, three used vernacular to indicate ‘made angry’. Two people had ‘no 
money to look for work’, two people wrote of diminished motivation; “I am 63 
years old” and “made my worthlessness and motivation worse” and another 
wrote; “bad back can’t work”. 
 
26: Has Centrelink given you a compulsory activity under their Mutual 
Obligation rules, such as “Work for the Dole” or a course of study? 
41% people responded ‘Yes’ (23), 52% ‘No’ (29), and 7% ‘Didn’t know’ (4). 
                                   
27: If you answered Yes, what were you compelled to do?  
 
Question 27 provided for an open-ended written response. 21 responses were 
received, the compulsory activities were categorised as follows: 
Instructed to attend interview (2). Instructed to attend study course (3). Given  
Intensive Assistance Program (5). Given Work for the Dole program (6). Given 
Job Search Training Program (4). Instructed to attend volunteer work (1). 
 
28: Have you signed a “Preparing for Work Agreement” with Centrelink? 
64% of respondents noted ‘Yes’ (36), 32% indicated ‘No’ (18), and 4% or two 
people ‘Didn’t know’. 
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29: Do you think that any activity Centrelink has made you do has meant  
that  you have become more likely to get  paid work?  
7% responded ‘Yes’ (4), contrasting with 73% of ‘No’ responses (41) and 20% of 
‘Don’t know’ (11). 
This is in line with the literature, to be discussed in Chapter Five following. 
 
30: When you received a breach penalty, was your self-esteem increased or 
decreased?   
Fully 93% of respondents (52 people) believed their self-esteem had decreased. 
5% were uncertain (3) and 2% or one person indicated increased self-esteem 
 
31: Did getting a breach penalty help you avoid being breached again? 
18% indicated ‘Yes’ (10 people), 62% indicated ‘No’ (35), 20% chose ‘Don’t 
know’ (11). 
                                        
The majority of respondents did not think the experience of being breached 
helped them to avoid further breaches. This has congruence with survey 
responses at Question 10, (more than half received multiple breaches) and the 
literature, and will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
32: After you were breached, did you stay in your existing residence? 
77% of people (43), reported staying in their accommodation, three of these 
wrote an extra comment implying ‘just managed’. However a surprising 23% of 
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respondents, 13 individuals, reported being unable to remain in their existing 
accommodation after being breached.  
 
33: If you answered No, did you shift into:  
a) Equally desirable accommodation?            One person responded ‘Yes’.  
b) Less desirable accommodation?         Twelve people responded ‘Yes’  
c) Some other accommodation?  
 
There were six written responses at part C: Three people wrote “on Streets”, one 
wrote “St Vincent de Paul Men’s Homeless Shelter” and two people moved to 
less desirable accommodation. Of the 12 people who found they needed to move 
into less desirable accommodation, only one was female, aged under thirty 
years. Of the 11 remaining males, nine were aged under thirty years. 
 
A consequence of being breached is that accommodation standards can be 
reduced, and this impacts more often on younger males, as has been noted in 
the literature (ACOSS, 2001b; Pearce et al., 2002) and will be discussed further 
in Chapter Five.   
 
From the initial response tallies, a few percentage figures stood out: 
95% of respondents (53 people) thought that, when breached, Centrelink was 
being unfair. 93% of respondents (52) felt that their self-esteem had decreased 
after being breached. 91% of respondents (51) did not realise beforehand, that 
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they were about to be breached and 89% of respondents (50 people) were in 
benefit programs involving activity tests. 
 
Table 2: Analysis of gender and age across breaches from respondents.  
 
 
YEAR 
 
TOTAL NO 
PEOPLE 
BREACHED 
 
MALES 
 
FEMALES 
 
AGE < 
30 
YEARS 
 
AGE 
>30 
YEARS 
 
TOTAL NO 
OF 
BREACHES  
LEAS 
THAN 
ONE 
YEAR 
 
MORE 
THAN 
ONE 
YEAR 
1999 17 9 8 7 10 22 8 9 
2000 17 15 2 10 7 27 11 6 
2001 25 17 8 16 9 37 16 9 
4MTH OF 
2002 
28 20 8 18 10 40 23 5 
 
From the above table of survey responses, increases may be seen in most 
categories for the four months of 2002, with more males aged under thirty years 
reporting more breaches within one year of starting on benefit. These increases 
will be discussed further in Chapter Five, which follows. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SURVEY FINDINGS  
 
 
At the outset it needs to be understood that references to ‘this survey’ or ‘this 
study’ mean the survey data collected and previously outlined in the methodology 
and survey response tally chapters of this thesis. For clarity the two terms will be 
italicised or underlined as appropriate.  As previously stated, the study seeks to 
examine whether the lived experiences of the survey respondents matched the 
expectation and intent of Centrelink’s breaching practices, as applied under the 
Mutual Obligation policy of the Howard Government.  
 
The literature review and data derived from Government policy publications 
facilitated preparation of the questionnaire instrument for this survey and 
construction of some hypotheses that could be questioned. However, it remains 
important to reiterate that the findings of this study reflect what happened to the 
56 survey respondents when they were breached. Such findings, on their own, 
do not establish that being breached causes these things to happen to people. 
 
Findings on Government expectations regarding breaching policy. 
 
In developing breaching policies, the Government appeared to make some 
assumptions that led it to have expectations about the effect of breaching 
penalties when applied to unemployed welfare recipients. Those expectations 
may have been unfounded. For example, the Government expected that people 
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who received a breach penalty would be motivated to ‘comply’ with activity tests 
and thus avoid further breaches.  
 
In 1997 the Government stated in Parliament that the Mutual Obligation 
breaching regime was expected “to maintain a strong deterrence for failure to 
meet reasonable requirements” (Moses & Sharples, 2000, p.4). See also 
(Centrelink, 2001a). As the Commonwealth Productivity Commission has put it; 
“a breaching regime is an important part of ensuring that unemployment 
beneficiaries seriously engage in job search or measures that improve their 
employability” (CPC, 2002, Sect. 6, p.17).  
 
This study indicated that some 62 per cent of respondents (35) indicated at 
Question 31 that getting a breach penalty was of no help to them in avoiding 
further breach penalties, and 20 per cent (11) indicated uncertainty as to any 
avoidance effect.  
 
The Government expected that one breach would be sufficient to deter people 
from being breached again (DEWRSB, 2001, p. 11), due to the sliding scale of 
increasing penalties for subsequent failures to comply with activity requirements. 
See also (ACOSS, 2001b, p.3; Burgess et al., 2000; Moses & Sharples, 2000). 
 
However at Question 10, more than half of the respondents to this study, almost 
56% or 31 people reported that they had been breached more than once. This 
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was congruent with the majority of respondents to this study reporting (at 
Question 31) that being breached once was of no help in avoiding further 
breaches. 
 
The Government also expected that compelling individuals to engage in Mutual 
Obligation type job search related activities would be accepted by unemployment 
benefit recipients. Beneficiaries would recognise the useful and practical aids 
provided to assist their job search, and participation would become a normal part 
of ‘reasonable’ job-seeker responsibilities (DEWRSB, 2001; Howard, 1999; 
Lauritsen, 2001; Moses & Sharples, 2000; Newman, 2000). 
 
However this survey found, at Question 29, that 73% of respondents, 41 out of 
56 people, believed that they were not more likely to get paid work because 
of any Centrelink compulsory activity undertaken. 
 
This response is not surprising. The Commonwealth Productivity Commission’s 
Draft Report noted that only 10% of unemployed people were more likely to get 
work as a result of participating in the Intensive Assistance Program (CPC, 
2002). DEWSRB’s (2000) evaluation of the Work for the Dole Program found that 
after five months fewer than 10% of participants were ‘off-benefit’ and presumed 
to be employed (p.5).  
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The Government also expected that a breaching regime built around activity test 
compliance and the ideology of Mutual Obligation would be politically popular. 
The Government had set about ensuring that society generally understood and 
agreed with the politically popular slogan that there was “no free ride” in welfare, 
and if the community (as taxpayer) was to provide support, something needed to 
be given back by welfare recipients (Anthony, 2000; Brough, 2001; Howard, 
1999;  Jackman, 2002;  Newman, 2000;  Vanstone & Abbott, 2001). 
 
‘Giving something back’ was seen as a political imperative to keep the 
community accepting of the unemployment welfare program, because of the well 
cultivated and popular belief in the existence of the ‘dole bludger’ frame of 
thinking (Brough, 2001; Parnell, 2002). The expectation of Mutual Obligation 
included “a need to make it harder for people to choose welfare over work” which 
had Prime Minister Howard and Minister Newman promulgating “tough love” 
(McKenna, 1999, p. 11). 
 
Reminiscent of the 1976 Fraser Government’s non-legislative “act of State 
repression” when it instructed Social Security field officers to increase activity 
against “unworthy” unemployment claimants (Windschuttle, 1980, pp. 218-219). 
The Howard Government also changed the rules for administrative and activity 
breaches, increased Mutual Obligation requirements and instructed Centrelink to 
increase compliance surveillance activity as a deterrent to claimants (ACOSS, 
2001b, p. 2; Burgess et al., 2000; Pearce et al., 2002; Sleep, 2001). 
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 The Government also pressured publicly funded Job Network agencies, 
contractually requiring them to increase the number of breach recommendations 
to be forwarded to Centrelink (ACOSS, 2001a, p. 8; DEWRSB, 2001, p. 10; 
Hannon, 2002, p.5; McLeod, 2001). Consequently Anglicare Australia noted 
“penalties have come to dominate the entire system” (Nevile, 2001, p. 3). 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, increased levels of breaching were reflected in 
the experiences of the survey respondents to this study, however respondents 
did not report receiving greater numbers of activity breaches, compared with 
administrative breaches by name, as expected (Moses & Sharples, 2000). Sleep 
(2001) had found that activity breaches were almost double those of 
administrative breaches issued in 1999-2000  (p. 6). Initial responses to this 
survey summed to 54 activity breaches and 66 administrative breaches.  
 
Figure 4: Reported administration versus activity breaches for this survey. 
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An explanation may lie in the following Figure 5, below. When actual breach 
penalties which respondents to this survey reported were given a secondary 
analysis by breach type, compared with the result obtained when respondents 
‘named’ their penalty, these responses now showed a reversal of the figures. 
Activity breaches reported in this manner exceed the number of administrative 
breaches reported. This analysis is possible because the breach penalties issued 
differed in value and duration between administrative and activity categories. 
This was the more expected result, in line with the literature. 
 
 
Figure 5: Types of breach penalty received by respondents to this survey. 
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To further clarify the initial ambiguity between the number of breaches reported 
by ‘name’ when compared with the number reported by ‘type’ in this survey, a 
triangulation was made. Comparing ACOSS’ (2001b, p. 9) findings that between 
September 2000 and February 2001 incidences of breaching were increasing, 
and 14 per cent of their respondents had been breached a third time. A third 
breach penalty means an activity breach that cuts all payment for 8 weeks. The 
ACOSS third breach figure co-relates closely with the findings of this survey, as 
14 per cent of respondents also indicated activity breaches at the third level.  
 
The finding illustrated at Figure 5 actually strengthens the representative nature 
and reliability of the responses reported in this study.  
   
Findings on Government intent regarding breaching policy. 
 
In the previous section some expectations of government were outlined. It may 
also be said that the government expected that not all unemployment 
beneficiaries would view Mutual Obligations “favourably”. Therefore “further 
compliance measures” would be required (Burgess et al., 1998, p. 13). The 
intensification of activity tests and the breaching regime thus developed as 
Government policy and intent. 
 
On coming to office in 1996, the Howard Government took steps to increase the 
frequency and cost impost of breach penalties (Moses & Sharples, 2000, p. 11; 
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Pearce et al., 2002). The intent appeared to be based on a belief that people who 
were breached would be more likely to increase efforts, with urgency, to find paid 
work and move ‘off-benefit’. Another assumption made was that people were not 
trying hard enough to find work, and as ‘non-genuine’ job seekers, therefore 
needed “coercive authority” (Kinnear, 2000, p.10; Edwards et al., 2001; Moses & 
Sharples, 2000.  p. 16).   
 
Various Ministers assumed tougher penalties would “flush out dole cheats” 
(Odgers, 2001;  Vanstone, 2002b). Deputy Prime Minister Anderson stated that 
people accepting dole payments but not looking hard enough for work were 
“deliberately shirking work…not the Australian way” (Parnell, 2002, p. 2). 
 
However, at Question 25 of this survey, which asked respondents if they thought 
threats of a breach penalty would make them look harder for work, 57 percent 
(32 people out of 56) responded ‘No’ and a further 9 per cent or 5 people 
indicated ‘don’t know’. The majority of people did not think that they needed 
to look for work harder or more urgently, under threat of a breach. Five 
respondents specifically wrote they were already looking ‘as hard as they could’. 
 
The literature supports the assertion that most people want to work and actively 
look for it (ACOSS, 2001a, p.5; Goodin, 2001, pp.196-197; Quiggin, 2001). 
However the Government intended that unemployed people should look even 
‘harder’ for work. Increasing obligations and penalties were previously noted,  
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see Burgess et al. (2000). The Government openly discussed the changes, using 
‘dole bludger’ rhetoric, because its intent was to create pressure on unemployed 
people to move ‘off-benefit’ (Moses & Sharples, 2000; Richardson, 2000).  
Government intent also included notions of ‘sustainable fiscal management’ 
(Newman, 2000) and the perceived political imperative of providing  “tough love” 
treatment to people who are “welfare dependant” (McKenna, 1999). Some 
beneficiaries were thought not to be seeking work hard enough, despite current 
high unemployment levels, so that in the words of Minister Brough they are 
“deservedly” called  “dole bludgers” (Atkins, 2002, p.1). Also see (Bryson, 1993; 
Titmuss, 2000).  
 
The researcher’s observations during this study, included viewing of  physical 
service arrangements provided at the Centrelink reception counters visited. It 
appeared unemployment customers were being treated with a lesser quality of 
service, because only two staff had been assigned to serve long queues of 
customers waiting in carefully designated areas. This contrasted with up to four 
staff positioned to attend to generally fewer customers in the Age and Disability 
Pension area. (Pensioner customers are permitted to mail their documents into 
Centrelink, unlike unemployment beneficiaries who must hand deliver them).  
 
Disgruntled comments made by people waiting in the unemployment section 
queues confirmed they felt undeserving, and that deliberate hindrance and 
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deterrence was being applied to them. See also MacDonald & Abello (2001, p.3) 
on “increased pressures” and Tomlinson (2001, pp. 7-10) on “harassment”.  
 
At question 17 of this study the majority of respondents indicated that they felt 
that Centrelink put them under pressure to go ‘off-benefit’ permanently. 79%, or 
44 people responded in this way. Thus Government intent, as expressed 
through Centrelink and Job Network processes, appears corroborated.  
 
Corroborating the literature and this survey, the Government’s intent in its 
treatment of unemployment beneficiaries as part of a politically perceived 
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ binary divide that has historically been applied to 
people in receipt of charity or welfare. The Government’s intent is to provide a 
‘safety net’ only for those considered ‘worthy’. Therefore, it seeks to ensure that 
those considered ‘unworthy’ should have their self esteem attacked, to deter 
‘wrong’ behaviour (ACOSS, 2001a, p.2; Bryson, 1993; Hall, 1998; Hartman, 
2001;  Kinnear, 2000; Tomlinson, 1999;  von Hayek, 2000). 
 
At Question 30, 93% of respondents, 52 out of 56 people indicated that upon 
receiving a breach penalty their self-esteem was decreased. 
 
The Government expects to make unemployed welfare recipients feel guilty. 
Particularly those suspected of not having “genuine need” (Newman, 2000, p. 7) 
or those who ‘need to confess’ to possibly having received any non-entitled 
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benefit (Dullroy, 2002). However the shaming process continues unabated, 
against all unemployed welfare beneficiaries, as the Government attempts to 
demonise unemployed ‘dole bludgers’.  
Ironically, as noted in Chapter Two, commentators including Minister Vanstone, 
acknowledged that deliberate welfare fraud and ‘bludging’ is of minuscule 
proportion amongst approximately six million social welfare recipients, 
particularly when compared to the cost of taxation fraud (Nolan, 1997, p. 186; 
Sleep, 2001; Vanstone, 2002b).  
 
On the shaming theme, Minister Newman promulgated the idea that there exists 
a “very severe stigma on people who remain on welfare support”, and such 
people should not remain on welfare “forever” (McKenna, 1999). The purpose of 
the rhetoric is to ensure that welfare recipients feel shamed, even without having 
been breached, with consequent lower self-esteem. The implied idea that 
unemployment is the fault of unemployed welfare beneficiaries is regularly noted 
in the literature (Gilmour et al., 2000, p. 3; Goodin, 2001, pp. 196-197).  
 
This raises the possibility that the Government’s intent in dealing with 
unemployed welfare recipients is to treat unemployed people in a different 
manner to other people who also receive welfare benefits and the community at 
large. Various examples of intended unfairness were noted in the literature. As 
previously noted, the Commonwealth Ombudsman found Centrelink was 
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applying breaches “without due process” (McLeod, 2000, p.51) and was ‘too 
quick to breach’ (Eldridge, 2001). 
 
Supporting the idea of differential treatment, it was noted in Chapter Two that the 
INTRALINK manual for Centrelink officers stated “job seekers must not be given 
the benefit of the doubt” (ACOSS, 2001a, p. 6, bolding in original). Similarly, this 
researcher heard many respondents state that “Centrelink does not listen”. It was 
noted that other sections of the community are not compulsorily obligated to the 
extent that unemployed welfare recipients are (Hartman, 2001).  
 
Also previously noted, breach penalty levels often exceed the value of fines 
imposed for many criminal convictions, which prompted ACOSS (2001b) to ask 
“is it fair?” (pp. 3-11). On fairness, it needs to be remembered that “Australia’s 
system of economic management has relied on creating joblessness to sustain 
economic growth” (Kinnear, 2000, p. v). Differential treatment and fairness will be 
discussed further in Chapter Six. 
 
This survey indicated that 95% of the 56 respondents at Question 16, a large 
majority of 53 people, thought that Centrelink was not being fair to them.    
 
Fairness can also be related to the extent that people receive proper 
explanations as to the requirements expected of them, and that due process, 
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including pre-notification of potential breaches, would be an integral part of 
Centrelink processes.  
 
However, at Question 23, a large majority, 91% of respondents, 51 people, did 
not expect to be breached before the penalty was applied.  
 
Whether or not the Howard Government intended to be unfair to this particular 
welfare group, the lived experience of this survey’s respondents strongly 
corroborated their expressed feelings that they were unfairly treated.  
 
The final important findings of this study to be presented here do not fit the 
categories of Government expectation and intent. The literature provided 
anecdotal evidence that people who have received breaches have subsequently 
suffered economic hardship, often becoming obliged to rely for survival on family 
and charity. Some have become homeless (four in this survey), or resorted to 
unlawful activities and other forms of illegal economic support. One respondent 
to this survey wrote “selling drugs to survive” (ACOSS, 2001b, p. 24; Moses & 
Sharples, 2000; Nevile, 2001; Sleep, 2001, p. 10). 
 
However, no evidence was uncovered in the literature to indicate that the 
Government means for these outcomes to happen. There exists however a body 
of literature that identifies ‘the unanticipated consequences of purposive social 
action’ (Merton, 1936). See also Burgess et al., (2000); Sleep, (2001). 
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Government policies can be unstated on occasion (Bridgman & Davis, 2000) and 
the unanticipated and unstated aspects that arose from this survey’s findings are 
reported here. 
Findings on Government unanticipated consequences of breaching. 
 
This survey identified one ‘unanticipated consequence’ finding: 
   
At Questions 31 and 32, there were 13 respondents who indicated that they 
needed to shift to other accommodation after being breached, and 12 of these 
indicated they moved to less desirable accommodation. 
 
Those 12 people, out of 56 respondents, represent a sizeable 22 per cent. It 
does not seem plausible that Government would anticipate such a high level of 
social disruption arising from its breaching policy, as homelessness and criminal 
activities of themselves become problems for Government.  
 
Hazlehurst and Braithwaite, (1993) reported “statistics show that both victims and 
perpetrators of crime are predominately under the age of twenty-nine; are 
unmarried, male, and unemployed; have low employment and educational 
opportunities; live in highly urbanised areas and/or display a high level of 
residential mobility” (p. 384).   
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Figure 6, below, illustrates the proportions of respondents to this survey who 
needed to move into less desirable accommodation. A larger proportion, 43 per 
cent of the 14 respondents from the lower socio-economic areas around Nundah 
Centrelink, contrasted with 15 per cent of the 42 respondents who came from 
higher socio-economic areas around the Mitchelton and Chermside survey sites. 
 
Figure 6: Diagrammatic representation of the total, higher and lower socio-
economic respondents moving into less desirable accommodation. 
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The statistical description of victims and perpetrators of crime, outlined above, 
appears to correlate well with the demographics of the respondents to this study, 
particularly those from the socio-economically disadvantaged area of Nundah 
(Wilson, 2002, p.27).  
Of the 12 people who moved to lesser accommodation, 10 were aged 30 or 
under, 11 were male, all lived in urban Brisbane and most reported needing to 
seek help from family and charity. Published crime statistics, such as those 
above, are in the public domain. However, the relatively high levels of the 
‘unanticipated’ consequence of people who are breached needing to move into 
less desirable housing, and even onto the streets, as experienced by some 
respondents to this survey is not well understood by the community. This lack of 
general awareness supports the notion that there could be some unanticipated 
policy outcomes attributable to the Howard Coalition Government.  
 
Findings on Government unstated consequences of breaching. 
 
The literature suggests that governments with neo-liberal agendas seek to 
relocate responsibility for welfare back to community welfare agencies, church 
groups and the families of individual welfare recipients, without specifically 
stating that as policy (Burgess et al., 1998; Burgess et al., 2000; Donald, 2000; 
Harris, 1998; Sleep, 2001; Stilwell, 1993).  
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At question 24 of this survey, ‘Did you get help from others?” 23 respondents 
selected  ‘family’, 15 indicated ‘welfare charity’ and 7 indicated ‘your church’. In 
each of the years 1999, 2000 and 2001, six respondents nominated ‘charity’ as a 
source of help after being breached. However in the first 4 months of 2002, 
eight people nominated ‘charity’.  
This number suggests large increases in dependence upon charity occurring in 
2002, and that growth corroborates the increased trend of demand for charity 
assistance reported in the literature (ACOSS, 2001b; Horan, 2001; Nevile, 2001;  
Stavropoulos, 2000). 
 
Government Ministers come close to openly stating their desire to shift welfare 
responsibility from government to community.  Prime Minister Howard’s stated 
purpose is “to build a new social coalition of government, business, charitable 
and welfare organisations, and other community groups…to tackle more 
effectively the social problems…” (Howard, 1999, p. 6). Ministers Vanstone and 
Abbott jointly announced new funding “to strengthen families and communities 
and prevent serious social problems occurring” (Vanstone & Abbott, 2001. p. 17). 
Unstated consequences will be discussed further in Chapter Six. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION  
 
The findings from this study suggested four aspects for discussion:  
• The Howard Government’s stated expectations about breaching practice. 
• The Howard Government’s stated intent about developing self-esteem. 
• Unanticipated policy outcomes. 
• Unstated policy agendas.  
 
Government expectation about the effectiveness of coercive practice. 
 
The Howard Government has consistently tightened its coercive practices in the 
breaching regime by increasing penalty frequency and cost for failure to comply 
with activity test requirements under Mutual Obligation ideology  (Atkins, 2002; 
Pearce et al., 2002). However the majority of respondents to this survey reported 
that getting breached was of no help to them in avoiding further breaches. Indeed 
the majority of respondents were breached more than once, and 14 per cent had 
third breaches. This accords with the literature (ACOSS, 2001b). 
 
Similarly, contrary to Government expectation, this survey found a large number 
of respondents (73%) believed that they were not more likely to get paid work as 
a result of their undertaking compulsory Centrelink activities. These findings raise 
questions about the effectiveness of compliance requirements and deterrent 
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effects of breaching, which the Government claimed for them, but were in line 
with the literature (CPC, 2002; DEWRSB, 2000).  
 
The Howard Government had developed a number of expectations about the 
effectiveness of a robust compliance regime to ensure unemployed people would 
actively seek work and move ‘off-benefit’ quickly (Centrelink, 2001a; DEWSRB, 
2001; Moses & Sharples, 2000; CPC, 2002, sect.6, p. 17).  Sleep (2001) 
suggested the neo-liberal agenda drew on Foucault’s approach to governance; 
“as managing populations through administrative techniques that convince 
individuals to discipline themselves” (p.14).  
 
As previously noted, high levels of unemployment had become entrenched, and 
a seemingly intractable problem for Government policy makers (Edwards et al., 
2001, p.144). Gilmour et al. (2000) reported that “welfare recipients’ obligations 
to society have been most clearly and extensively discussed in DEWRSB and 
DFaCS policy documents” (p. 3).  
 
Subsequently Allard pointed to claims about the “culture of welfare dependency” 
and the rise of the “job snob”. Allard noted that Ministers were saying it was 
individual culture rather than economic policy which gave rise to high 
unemployment rates, so as to justify the punitive breaching requirements under 
Mutual Obligation (cited in Gilmour et al., 2000, p.3). Hartman (2001) argued that 
“blaming the victim” could justify less spending [on welfare] and a “punitive 
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approach to the unemployed” (p. 3), which reflected Government expectations as 
to the political acceptability of its policies publicly, and within the bureaucracy.  
 
An officer within the Department of Family and Community Services, (Pearse, 
2000) reported the differential result between a pilot program’s interview 
attendance rates for beneficiaries who were required to attend (82%) and those 
who were invited (17%). This officer continued confidently; “one of the most 
important findings of the pilot study was how effective the compulsory approach 
was at bringing customers in to an interview and how little adverse reaction there 
was to a compulsory approach” (pp. 3-8).  
 
Minister Anthony, defending Government policy about rising breach numbers, 
stated: “However the vast majority of job seekers have no problem fulfilling their 
mutual obligation requirements. Around 82% of job seekers are never breached” 
(Anthony, 2001). That statement has a different connotation, or ‘spin’, to the 
reality that almost one fifth of job seekers are now breached, compared to less 
than one tenth just three years ago (Sleep, 2001).  
 
McKenna (1999) reported the Howard Government’s expectation, that coercion, 
compulsion and heavy penalties for failure to comply with activity tests, will 
create public opprobrium against ‘the unemployed’, thus effectively minimising 
the ‘problem of the unemployed’ by making it “harder for people to choose 
welfare over work” (p. 11). 
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However, the literature is often critical of the attitude of neo-liberal governments 
toward welfare. Jennings (2001) argued that conservative forces have a common 
misconception: “That poverty is the result of primarily individual choice rather 
than as an outcome of social policies”. She argued further that the Howard 
Government believes people are responsible for outcomes over which they have 
no control (such as insufficient jobs), so that “blaming the victim allows policy 
makers to absolve themselves from responsibility” (p. 4).   
 
Professor Pearce discussed the Pearce et al. (2002) report on television, 
confirming that breaching incidences had tripled during the past three years. The 
ex-Ombudsman believed that being breached created disincentives to seek 
work, and reduced the ability to look for work, thereby harming the chances of 
individuals to find employment. Thus he thought breaching to be counter 
productive, concluding that he “personally believed that you don’t induce” by 
“beating up” but by offering an inducement of “help” (ABC, 2002).  
 
Such conclusions were supported by Burgess et al. (2000) who wrote about the 
“doomed” nature of “workfare” as a means of enforcing reciprocal obligations. 
See also (Goodin, 2001, pp. 1-92; Lawrence, 2002; Windschuttle, 980). Sleep 
(2001) argued that “hard-liners assume all breaches are legitimate”, but there 
was insufficient recognition that “Centrelink is not infallible” (p. 10), because the 
Government expected the compliance regime would be an effective deterrent.  
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The Government erroneously expects a harsher penalty regime will coerce 
people to find jobs in an environment of high unemployment. Figures of between 
7 and 10 unemployed people for every job vacancy are given in the literature 
(ACOSS, 2001). Lawrence (2002) had pointed out that there are “still ten job 
seekers for every one vacancy” and “getting tough” on “dole bludgers” cannot fix 
any unemployment problem (pp. 2-4). Moses and Sharples (2000) addressed the 
issue of making breach penalties harsher, arguing that such action would not 
have much effect on breach rates because earlier “Working Nation changes also 
made breach penalties harsher, but breach rates remained fairly constant from 
1995 to 1998” (p. 11).  
 
Paradoxically, Moses and Sharples (2000) introduced the argument that “if the 
main objective of making breach penalties harsher is to deter people from failing 
to meet their requirements, then the measure of success of any such policy…is 
the extent to which breach numbers fall” (p. 11). Breach numbers have not fallen, 
they have risen substantially, and respondents to this survey report that the 
coercion they experienced did not help them search harder for work because 
they were already looking as hard as they could. 
 
Government intent about development of self-esteem and fairness. 
 
One cannot ‘know’ intent, however Prime Ministerial statements about 
Government needing to exhibit “fairness” and provide for “equality of opportunity” 
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for people who comply with Mutual Obligation, which will “improve prospects for 
[their] self-reliance” (Howard, 1999, pp. 2-9), include euphemisms for ‘improving 
self-esteem’ and greater ‘employability’. Further, Minister Anthony stated that 
involvement in Mutual Obligation activity “leaves people with a sense of pride and 
belonging” (Anthony, 2000, p.1). The results from this survey appear to be 
contrary to the Government’s stated intent as to fairness or self-esteem.  
 
Important responses to this survey recorded most people reporting loss of self-
esteem and many felt Centrelink put pressure on them to go ‘off-benefit’ 
permanently. Many respondents felt they could not look any harder for work and 
an overwhelming majority believed that Centrelink was being unfair to them. 
  
In terms of self-esteem, there is support for the notion that “people want to work”, 
even when subjected to the “churning” treadmill of low paid casual jobs in an 
employment market that demonstrably has insufficient jobs (Lawrence, 2002,  
p.2;  Burgess et al., 1998;  McKinnon & Dorries, 1999;  Quiggin, 2001). Goodin, 
(2001) argued that “most of those who want to work, but don’t”, are unemployed 
due to external circumstances that have “nothing to do with the sort of ‘weakness 
of will’ arguments” put forward (pp. 196-197). Reliant on social security, the 
respondents to this survey considered their self-esteem under attack.  
 
The ‘dole bludger’ and thinly veiled ‘it is their own fault’ rhetoric is palpable. See 
the ‘labeling’ comments of (Anthony, 2000; Newman, 2000; Vanstone & Abbott, 
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2001). This survey also found that most respondents did not realise beforehand 
that they were going to be breached, suggesting Centrelink has a lack of concern 
as to customer rights, due process and procedural fairness.  
 
The Howard Government, using Mutual Obligation ideology, intends to coerce 
people to remain “active and connected” with the workplace, believing that their 
chances of finding work would thus be enhanced (Parnell, 2002, p.2;  
Richardson, 2000). The intent is well understood within Government. Moses and 
Sharples (2000) mused:  “For policy makers (short of reviewing the entire 
concept of breaching)  the important question…is how best to target breaching to 
ensure that it is achieving its purpose of deterring non-genuine job seekers and 
ensuring that people are doing all they can to return to work?” (p. 20). 
 
MacDonald and Abello (2001) reported “increased pressure from the Department 
of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business” to increase breaching 
levels (p.3). Burgess et al. (1998) observed application of increased compliance 
measures (p. 13) and Minister Vanstone (2002a) announced “additional scrutiny” 
of beneficiaries so as to ensure continuation of a “robust mutual obligation 
system” (p. 2). As noted in Chapter Two, automated paperless breach processes 
(DEWRSB, 2001) and excessive breach penalty fines all attest to Government 
intent to coerce unemployed people ‘off-benefit’ in a manner often seen as being 
unfair (ACOSS, 2001a). 
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Again on intent, the Australian compliance system is “already among the 
toughest in the world” (ACOSS, 2001a). As to fairness, the Prime Minister’s own 
Youth Pathways Taskforce summary report commented that the coercive nature 
of the breaching regime by Centrelink was “too rigid in applying activity tests” to 
young people experiencing life difficulties (Eldridge, 2001). Similarly the 
Ombudsman and ACOSS have criticised the inequitable and flawed nature of the 
breaching regime, as noted earlier (McLeod, 2001, p.52; ACOSS, 2001b, p.3).  
 
Hartman (2001) argued the Howard Government’s application of Mutual 
Obligation, which “elaborates the responsibilities of the unemployed and other 
jobless welfare recipients and renders them accountable for their activities in a 
way that is not reciprocated by other so-called stakeholders in society, 
government and business” (pp. 5-6) represents differential treatment.  
 
As a counter to the claim of differential treatment, DFACS (2000) argued that 
“some form of financial sanction must be available as a last resort” for 
unemployed people because “business and government also face formal 
sanctions when requirements are not met” (p. 40). However, the notion that 
businesses or Government itself could have all income revenue cut off totally for 
eight weeks as a ‘normal sanction’, as happens to people in the breaching 
regime, appears “highly unlikely” as defined by (Neuman, 1997).   
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As to self-esteem and fairness, Tomlinson (2001) argued that there can be no 
reciprocity or respect due to the power imbalance: “Unemployed people and the 
Government can’t have the same relation each towards the other” (p. 6, italics in 
original). Tomlinson (2001) also argued that the “Howard Government’s ‘mutual 
obligation’ agenda is considered to be in breach of the international agreements 
which Australia has signed and ratified”. He cited Article 8(3)(a) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides that “No one 
shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour”  (pp. 10-11), as in Work 
for the Dole. See also (Burgess et al., 1998, p. 17).   
 
Kinnear (2000) declared that the Howard Government’s Mutual Obligation 
policies failed ethically and morally. Citing Rawls, Kinnear argued that 
Government institutional programs “must be just, and individuals must have 
freely accepted the benefits provided by society”. She found the two 
conditionalities were not met (p. v).  Goodin (2001) argued the unfairness of one-
sided Government relationships with welfare recipients succinctly, decrying the 
attendant duress (p. 191). Duress does not appear to be conducive to 
development of individual self-esteem, yet that is a stated Government intent. 
 
Government intention to reduce welfare dependency is demonstrably 
unnecessary. In a seminal longitudinal study conducted over 10 years in three 
countries, The United States, The Netherlands and Germany, Goodin, Heady, 
Muffels, and Dirven (1999) found an “exceedingly small percentage” of people 
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remained on welfare indefinitely, in any of those national welfare systems. 
Further, they found the rhetoric of “welfare dependency” referred to in those 
countries, and often heard in Australia, to be unfounded (pp. 136-145).  
 
The Government’s recently stated intent to target almost all unemployed people 
through Centrelink’s activity testing and breaching program  (Jackman, 2002, p. 
5; Centrelink, 2001a) because of suspicion that unemployed people fail to meet 
activity requirements that have little to do with willingness to work, is excessive 
(Lawrence, 2002). Windschuttle (1980) had debunked the myth of “dole 
bludgers” twenty years earlier (pp. 155-179).  
 
Concluding this discussion on Government intent, the Government had 
commissioned the McClure report on Welfare reform, to which ACOSS (2000) 
responded: “The Government must take serious heed of [the report’s] central 
message – that the current reliance on one-sided obligations and harsh penalties 
is a wrong and counter-productive path.” Further obligations on unemployed 
people “should be reasonable and fair”, so that penalties “are used only as a last 
resort and are reduced to levels appropriate to people on low incomes” (p.2).  
 
An unanticipated  consequence of Government breaching policy. 
 
Two findings in Chapter Five, arising from this survey did not seem to ‘fit’ with the 
Howard Government’s stated expectation or intent. An apparently unanticipated 
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outcome surfaced, another outcome appeared to reflect unstated policy. The 
unanticipated consequence of breaching that surfaced was that many more 
people than expected needed to move into less desirable accommodation after 
being breached.  
 
It is not plausible to believe that the Government intends or expects its Mutual 
Obligation based breaching program should create homelessness or push 
people who have been breached into less desirable accommodation. Yet from 
the survey, 12 people out of 56 (almost 22%) needed to move into less desirable 
accommodation, including 10 males under 30 years of age. It is important to 
reiterate that most of the respondents to this survey were still unemployed and 
partially ‘on-benefit’, because they were without legitimate options for survival, 
other than limited family or charitable support. 
 
Patterns of poverty, unemployment and homelessness for young males who 
have been breached by Centrelink are highlighted in this survey. A secondary 
analysis of data from 14 responses collected from outside Nundah Centrelink, 
which is situated in a lower socio-economic area than the other two survey sites 
(Wilson, 2002) indicated that six out of the 14 respondents (almost half), needed 
to move into less desirable accommodation. One of these people reported 
moving “on the streets”, another to a homeless shelter. There appears to be a 
correlation between breaching, reduced housing standards and homelessness 
for people in lower socio-economic circumstances. 
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The Howard Government may not have intended for its breaching regime to 
cause people to move into less desirable accommodation, or drive them ‘off-
benefit’ into illegal activity. DEWRSB’s (2001) Program Monitoring Survey found 
that between 20 and 30 per cent of Job Network program participants left the 
programs, thus going ‘off-benefit’, but for “reasons that were not known”. 
DEWRSB suggested possible reasons could include “changes in family/living 
arrangements and clients leaving the labour market” (p.15, italics added).  
 
It is known that the Government intentionally targeted young people under 
Mutual Obligation initially (DEWRSB, 1999; Sleep, 2001, p. 9). Only recently has 
there been a shift towards targeting older welfare recipients, and other categories 
of welfare beneficiaries, with changes generally applying from July 2002 
(Moscaritolo & Keim, 2001). The deliberate targeting of younger people may 
partially explain why, in this survey, so many young people needed to downgrade 
to less desirable accommodation after being breached. That outcome is in line 
with the literature (Eldridge, 2001). 
 
It may also be that the young people surveyed in this study, especially those from 
lower socio-economic backgrounds, may have been disadvantaged in terms of 
educational and skill acquisition opportunities, with consequent disadvantage as 
to employability. Such disadvantage tends to limit people, as they are able to 
access only temporary, low-paid, casualised work (Lawrence, 2002). Further 
compounding that limiting disadvantage, younger people are generally unable to 
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access credit facilities, which would enable them to maintain a stable residence. 
Consequently, only high cost, barely ‘affordable’ rental market housing is 
accessible (Nevile, 2001). The precarious affordability that allows this existence 
is jeopardised immediately when a breach penalty reduces or stops fortnightly 
income. 
 
Anglicare Australia’s State of Family 2001 report cited Metherell’s survey of 13 
homeless youth shelters in Sydney, which had found that more than “one third of 
those using the centres” had been breached by Centrelink (Nevile, 2001, p.30; 
Rollason, 2001). The fact that one third of the most vulnerable people who were 
using the centres and had been breached raises questions for further research. 
Little is known about homeless people without the ability to access homeless 
shelters, but who have also been breached.  ACOSS (2001b) reported 
“anecdotal evidence also points, in some cases, to an increase in theft and 
unlawful activity in order [for those breached] to survive” (p. 24).  
 
An unstated Government policy to return welfare to the community.   
 
The second aspect of the findings of this study that did not ‘fit’ with the Howard 
Government’s stated expectation or intent represents an unstated policy. It is 
unstated that Centrelink breaching practices should drive unemployed welfare 
recipients ‘off-benefit’, thereby forcing them to seek support from family or 
community, church or welfare organisations, in order to survive. In this survey, 23 
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people indicated that they obtained assistance from family, 15 people indicated 
being helped by charities and seven indicated that their church was of help. 
These rates of charity support need, and increases in usage, are in line with the 
literature (ACOSS, 2001b; Horan, 2001; Nevile, 2001, p. 30). 
 
For example, whilst Government Departments speculated on probable policy 
outcomes, the speculation was not identified as official policy. Moses and 
Sharples (2000) reported a “very conservative” estimate that  “27% of people 
who are breached do not reclaim within 6 weeks”. They suggested “it could 
be argued that for some the system just becomes too hard and that they turn to 
relatives, the welfare sector or crime for support” (p. 17, bolding in original).  
 
Minister Newman stressed the importance of “ensuring that support does not go 
unconditionally for long periods to people with the capacity to contribute to their 
own support…” (Newman, 2000, p. 5). Ministers Vanstone and Abbott jointly 
announced new funding “to strengthen families and communities and prevent 
serious social problems occurring” (Vanstone & Abbott, 2001, p. 17).  
 
Prime Minister Howard provided the strongest indication that policy is often 
unstated, but of primary importance, regardless of delivery systems;  
Policy mechanisms or fashions are never ends in themselves. In defining 
the right approach to both economic and social policies, we should always 
remember that it is the goals of national policy which are the critically 
important determining factor, and not the mechanism for implementing 
policies or the ideologies that may support them (Howard, 1999) (pp. 2-3). 
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The Howard Government continues producing politically expedient ‘policy on the 
run’ changes to Mutual Obligation (Quiggin, 2001, pp. 11-12). For example, 
recent announcements outlining new categories of beneficiaries that will be 
required to Work for the Dole (Atkins, 2002), and new authority for Centrelink to 
apply instant payment ‘suspension’ rules, thereby stopping all payment, rather 
than initial payment reductions (Vanstone, 2002a, p. 2). The changes were 
introduced, ostensibly to make breaching less damaging to ‘the disadvantaged’.  
 
However the changes will include tough new Centrelink psychological 
assessment procedures that have been designed to enable Centrelink to check 
eligibility that can facilitate benefit suspension ‘on suspicion’ of likelihood to be 
breached (Centrelink, 2002). The ‘policy on the run’ changes are a part of 
“keeping the breaching regime tough” (Vanstone, 2002a, pp. 2-3), which is seen 
as a “political imperative” (Burgess et al., 1998, p.2). 
 
As found in this study, breaching practices impacted on the lives of the survey 
respondents in unanticipated or unstated ways in terms of policy implementation. 
Tomlinson (1999) juxtaposed the Government’s implied notion that it is socially 
‘bad’ to develop a dependency on government welfare, but socially ‘good’ that 
other family members of people who are welfare beneficiaries are “forced into a 
co-dependency relationship with each other” (p.5). Ironically, when the Coalition 
came to power, it eschewed job creation policies and focussed on the “self-
reliance” of workers in an open labour market (Quiggin, 2001 p.11).  
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However high levels of unemployment, and precarious forms of casualised 
employment, did not provide sufficient employment or the “necessary conditions 
to facilitate self-reliance in the form of superannuation savings” (Carson & Kerr, 
2001, p. 15). See also Eardley’s (1998) discussion on the “working poor” whose 
low paid, casual and part time work maintains poverty.  
 
The literature identifies evidence to show that people who have been breached, 
“return to benefit receipt” within months, because they have no choice 
(Richardson, 2000, p. 17). Returning to benefit is contrary to the Government’s 
stated expectation or intent. Most respondents to this survey did select non-
government support providers, but found that unsustainable, continuing to need 
income support from Centrelink.  
 
Thus it is evident that Government breaching policy, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally designed to drive people toward community provided support, has 
not been successful.  Indeed, of the four Howard Government policy areas 
discussed; the expected, the intended, the unexpected and the unstated, none 
have been shown to be operating in line with the Howard Government’s stated 
policies. This lack of success is evidenced by responses to this survey. What has 
also been evident, is that the policies and breaching practices implemented 
under Mutual Obligation strike at the most vulnerable and least advantaged 
people within the Brisbane community (ACOSS, 2001b; Nevile, 2001). 
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CONCLUSION: 
 
As stated at the outset, the central objective of this study was to explore the lived 
experience of people who had been breached by Centrelink, to assess if their  
experiences matched what the Howard Government expected and intended, 
when it applied its evolving breaching policies and practices, based upon the 
ideology of Mutual Obligation. 
 
The choice for a qualitative survey was determined by time and resource 
constraints, and was based on an extensive literature review including ‘inside’ 
Government perspectives and data. Essential background material, relating to 
the nature of entrenched unemployment conditions and Mutual Obligation 
ideology was incorporated to underscore the ‘justification’ that the Howard 
Government provides when applying its demonstrably harsh breaching regime. 
 
The quoted literature identified harm done to unemployed individuals when 
breached. For instance Anglicare asserted that Centrelink’s  “punish first” 
approach was costly for individuals (Rollason, 2001), and there was recognition 
that compulsory obligations on unemployed people were unreasonable and 
unfair (ACOSS, 2000, p.2). This survey found that people who were breached 
had their lives seriously affected in one or more of four major areas. The Howard 
Government does not publicly acknowledge that these outcome effects have 
resulted from Government policies.  
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This survey found that Mutual Obligation ideology and mandatory activity test 
requirements led to people, who were breached, experiencing frustration, 
decreased self-esteem and strong feelings of being unfairly treated. Many of 
those people also needed to move into less desirable accommodation, 
reinforcing a need for further research in this area. Their plight appears to negate 
the often boasted about claims proclaiming the effectiveness of the “safety net” 
the Howard Government provides for people “genuinely in need” (Howard, 1999, 
p. 4; Vanstone, 2002a).  
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Appendix One: Complete survey instrument with ‘informed consent’. 
                                              A   SURVEY 
 
 
DO THE LIVED EXPERIENCES OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN BREACHED 
BY CENTRELINK MATCH THE EXPECTATION, INTENT AND PURPOSE OF  
                                            GOVERNMENT? 
 
This research survey is being conducted as part of my Masters Degree studies in 
Social Science at Queensland University of Technology during 2002. 
 
My name is Simon Schooneveldt, and I can be contacted through QUT 
Carseldine, at the School of Humanities and Human Services (see numbers 
below) or direct via my mobile phone message bank on 0407 625 853. 
 
This survey is anonymous. You will not be asked for your name, address or any 
identifying information. It is an entirely voluntary way for people who are 18 years 
and older, and who have received a breach penalty from Centrelink, to have a 
say about their breaching experience(s).  
 
The research is aimed at increasing knowledge about whether the ‘real – life’ 
experiences of survey participants are similar to what Centrelink and the 
Government expected, or if they are different. The findings of the research may 
be presented at seminars and conferences in the future. 
 
Therefore your participation will be helpful. The questionnaire form can be filled 
out right now and will take about 15 minutes. The form is mostly “tick the box” in 
style, but there are places where you can write extra comments if you wish. 
 
You can keep this cover sheet if you would like to, after handing back the 
completed survey part to me. 
 
Should you require further information please feel free to contact my Supervisor, 
Dr. John Tomlinson at QUT on 3864 4528.  
 
If you have any concerns or complaints about the way that I am conducting this 
survey, you can contact the Secretary of The University Human Research Ethics 
Committee on 3864 2902.  
 
Thank you,      Simon Schooneveldt.
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
1: Are you aged 18 years or older?  (please tick box) [  ]Yes  [  ] No 
 
 
2: Have you ever been breached by Centrelink?   [  ]Yes  [  ] No 
 
 
If under 18 years, or you have never been breached, no need to continue. 
 
 
3: Are you under 30 years old?  (please tick box)  [  ]Yes  [  ] No 
 
 
4: Are you male or female? (please tick box)                 [  ] M  [  ] F 
 
 
5: How would you best describe your living arrangements?   
 
(please tick box) 
 
[   ] Single, living alone   [  ] Single, sharing group house  [  ] Living with partner 
 
[   ] Living with partner and children   [   ] Single, with children [  ] Other……….. 
   
 
 
6: When you were breached, what Centrelink payment were you getting? 
 
(please tick box)             
 
[  ] Newstart.                   [  ] Youth  Allowance.                [  ] Parenting Payment.  
 
[  ]Partner Allowance.            [  ] Disability Support Pension.             [  ] Austudy.   
 
[  ] Other Payment ………….………………………………………….. 
 
 
 
7: How long were you on that payment before getting breached?  
 
(please tick box) 
 
[  ] 1 - 6 Months.  [  ] 7 Months to 1 Year.  [  ] 1 to 2 Years. [  ] More than 2 years.
 106
  
8: What is your main activity currently?  
 
(please tick box):     
 
[  ] Part time work.        [  ] Looking for work.     [  ]  studying.     [  ] Home Duties.  
 
[  ] Retired        [  ] Other…………………………………………………  
 
 
 
9: In which years were you breached?  
 
(please tick any years that apply to you): 
  
      [  ] 1999.    [  ] 2000.        [  ] 2001.      [  ] 2002. 
 
 
 
10: How many times have you been breached in the last 4 years? 
 
(please tick box) 
 
[  ] Once.         [  ] Twice.      [  ] 3 times.     [  ] More than 3 times. 
 
 
 
11: If you have had what Centrelink calls an Administrative Breach, please tick  
 
the box  showing number of times:  
 
[  ] Once   [  ] Twice       [  ] More than twice 
 
 
 
12: If you have had what Centrelink calls an Activity Breach,  
 
please tick the box showing number of times:  
 
[  ] Once   [  ] Twice       [  ] Three times or more  
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13: What were the penalty or penalties that you received?  
 
(please tick one or more of the boxes that apply to you)  
 
[  ] Nil payment at all for 2 weeks                       [  ] 16% reduction for 13 weeks 
   
[  ] 18% reduction for 26 weeks                          [  ] 24% reduction for 26 weeks 
   
[  ] Nil payment at all for 8 weeks  
 
 
 
14: Did Centrelink give you any reasons why they gave you a penalty breach?  
 
(please tick box) 
   [  ] Yes   [  ] No        [  ] Don’t know 
 
 
 
15: If you answered Yes, do you remember any reasons Centrelink gave you? 
 
(Typical reasons could be that ‘you didn’t turn up for an interview’ or that  
 
Centrelink thought ‘you didn’t fill out your job seeker diary well enough.’)  
 
Your answer here: ……………………………………………….…………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
16:  When you got breached, did you think that Centrelink was being fair to you?  
 
(please tick box) 
          [  ] Yes   [  ] No      [  ] Don’t know 
 
 
17: Do you feel that Centrelink puts you under pressure to make you go off  
 
benefits permanently? 
 
(please tick box) 
            [  ] Yes   [  ] No  [  ] Don’t know
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18: Did you realise that you could appeal against Centrelink’s decision to give  
 
you a breach penalty?    
 
(please tick box) 
[  ]  Yes          [  ]  No          [  ] Don’t know 
 
 
 
 
19: Did you appeal your breach penalty decision to Centrelink?  
 
(please tick box) 
[  ] Yes    [  ] No          [  ] Don’t know 
 
 
 
 
20: If you appealed, was your appeal successful? 
 
(please tick box)       
[  ] Yes          [  ] No          [  ] Don’t know  
 
 
 
 
21: If you appealed, how long did your appeal process take?       
 
please place the nearest number in the box for either:      
 
[        ]      weeks      or         [      ] months 
 
 
 
 
22: If your breaches meant that Centrelink stopped all benefit payments to you, 
 
how long was it before you re-applied to Centrelink for another benefit?   Please 
 
place the nearest number in the box for either:   
 
[        ]      weeks      or          [      ] months. 
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23: Did you expect to get breached before the penalty was actually given to  
 
you by Centrelink ? (Did you see it coming?)     
 
(please tick box)   
[  ] Yes   [  ] No    [  ] Don’t know 
 
Any comment? ………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
24: After you received a breach penalty, did you get any help from others?  
 
(please tick one or more boxes to best describe who you went to for any help)  
 
[  ] Family?      [  ] Friends?      [  ] Welfare Rights Group?      [  ] Your Church?       
 
[  ] Welfare charity agency?     [  ] Other? ………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
25: Do you think the threat of a breach penalty made you look harder for a job? 
 
(please tick box) 
[  ] Yes [  ] No        [  ] Don’t know 
 
You can add a comment about your answer here: 
  
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………..  
 
 
26: Has Centrelink given you a compulsory activity under their Mutual Obligation  
 
rules, such as “Work for the Dole”  or a course of study? 
 
(please tick box) 
[  ] Yes [  ] No  [  ] Don’t know
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27: If you answered Yes, what were you compelled to do?  
 
( please answer here)…………… ……………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
28: Have you signed a “Preparing for Work Agreement” with Centrelink ? 
 
(please tick box)  
[  ] Yes [  ] No  [  ] Don’t know 
 
 
 
 
29: Do you think that any activity Centrelink has made you do has meant  
 
that you have become more likely to get  paid work?  
 
(please tick box) 
     [  ] Yes [  ] No  [  ] Don’t know 
 
 
 
30: When you received a breach penalty, was your self-esteem increased or  
 
decreased?   
 
(please tick box) 
 
[  ] Increased  [  ] Decreased  [  ] Don’t know 
 
 
 
 
31: Did getting a breach penalty help you to avoid being breached again? 
 
(please tick box) 
       [  ] Yes [  ] No  [  ] Don’t know
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32: After you were breached, did you stay in your existing residence? 
 
(please tick box)  
[  ] Yes [  ] No.         
 
 
 
33: If you answered No,  did you shift into:  
 
(please tick box): 
 
d) equally desirable accommodation?              [  ] Yes [  ] No 
 
e) less desirable accommodation?   [  ] Yes [  ] No 
 
c)  Some other accommodation? Please describe …………………………………  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this QUT University Student research survey.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simon Schooneveldt.  
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Appendix Two: The on-site advertising signs inviting participants. 
 
 
 
HAVE YOU BEEN 
BREACHED 
BY  
CENTRELINK?? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A UNIVERSITY 
STUDENT 
SURVEY             
for those 18 and older 
HAVE YOUR SAY 
NOW! 
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Appendix Three: Note of visit to Qld. Police and Brisbane Council. 
 
THESIS; RESEARCH PREPARATION FILE NOTES: 
 
ETHICAL APPLICATION TASKS/ NOTES 
 
9.57am: Visited Ferny Grove Police District Headquarters. Saturday 
09/03/2002 
 
Spoke with Duty Desk Constable, who was supported by his Senior Sargent. 
 
Submitted pro-forma of my proposed sign (including QUT logo) with an outline 
of my intent to conduct a survey on the footpath, outside of Centrelink offices. 
 
As it happened, the Constable had done a similar university survey (70 
respondents) during his studies, and the organisation he surveyed simply 
asked him for any findings at completion, so that they could get any useful 
feedback. 
 
In the event, the Police have no problem with the proposed research activity 
and confirmed that it is not unlawful. 
 
 
 
On Monday 10th March, 2002,   9.45AM: 
 
I visited Marjorie at the Gap Ward office of Councilor Geraldine Knapp of 
Brisbane City Council.   Marjorie telephoned By-Laws Officer Peter, who 
confirmed her opinion that my proposal was OK, including using a card table, 
as long as the footpath not obstructed. There was no problem with only two or 
3 days appearance on site.  She likened it to charity footpath cake stalls.  
Temporary signage OK (I had shown my prototype sign) and no licence would 
be required by Council. 
 
NB: I searched the web for both of these agencies and found nothing on my 
particular request about conducting a street/ footpath survey. 
 
Also discussed with Jacquie (a researcher) the pro-forma proposed sign, 
which would contain the phrase “have your say now”. She advised that is 
legitimated by the use of open questions that allow writing in boxes on the 
survey questionnaire. 
 
Advised my QUT Supervisor, Dr John Tomlinson of these responses at 
meeting at QUT Carseldine, this day, Monday 10th March, 2002.            
 
 
Simon  Schooneveldt.
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Appendix Four: Courtesy letter to CEO, Centrelink notifying survey.  
 
 
 
The Chief Executive Officer, Ms Sue Vardon, 
CENTRELINK 
PO Box 7788 
Canberra Business Centre 
ACT. 2610. 
 
April 5, 2002 
 
 
Dear Ms Vardon, 
 
 
RE:  Upcoming survey on Centrelink client breaching in Brisbane. 
 
 
I write as a courtesy, to advise you that during the next two months I will be 
conducting a questionnaire type survey of people, aged 18 or over, who have 
received breach penalties from Centrelink. The survey is being conducted as 
a part of my post-graduate studies for a Masters Degree in Social Science 
within the School of Humanities and Human Services at the Carseldine 
campus of Queensland University of Technology. 
 
 
As sole researcher, I will passively and lawfully position myself on public 
property outside various Brisbane Centrelink offices, equipped with 
appropriate signage. The signs have been designed to attract the attention of 
potential survey participants who may be in that vicinity, inviting them to 
approach myself as the researcher and thus become enabled to participate in 
the survey. 
 
I have submitted the proposed survey method and intended signage to the 
Queensland Police Service and the Brisbane City Council, and ascertained 
the acceptability and lawfulness of the proposed survey. Additionally, I have 
secured written approvals to proceed with the survey program from my 
academic research supervisor at QUT, together with the Head of The School 
of Humanities and Human Services at QUT Carseldine and the Chairperson 
of the University Human Research Ethics Committee (UHREC). 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Simon Schooneveldt.
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Appendix Five: ‘Authorisation to proceed’ letter from UHREC. 
 
 
 
 
Confirmation of exemption – 2578H 
 
 
Dear Simon 
 
I write further to the Checklist for Researchers you submitted for your project, 
"Do the lived experiences of people who have been breached by Centrelink 
match the expectations, intent and purpose of Government?" (QUT Ref No 
2578H). 
 
The Chairperson of the University Human Research Ethics Committee has 
considered your Checklist and asked that I contact you on her behalf. The 
Chairperson has confirmed that your project is in fact exempt from full ethical 
clearance. 
 
This decision is subject to the inclusion of the standard reference to the 
Secretary of UHREC in the informed consent materials. 
 
However, you are authorised to immediately commence this research on 
this basis. 
 
Failure to provide, in a timely manner, the requested information (eg the 
revised informed consent material) may result in the authorisation to 
commence the research being withdrawn. 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any further queries in relation 
to this matter. 
 
Regards 
 
Gary Allen 
Secretary, UHREC 
x2902  
 
Wednesday, April 03, 2002 11:58 AM 
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